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INTRODUCTION
Capitalism, in most large public corporations, has been subtly
transformed from a system of dominance by the suppliers of
capital to a system of dominance by the managers, dubbed
"managerialism." In many respects, managerialism is beneficial
to investors and other enterprise constituencies, since managers'
rewards typically grow with the profitability of the enterprise.
But managerialism permits drastic wastes of resources when
managers hang on to their jobs after they have become ineffi-
cient or spend lavishly to defend themselves against takeover
bids. Derivative suits, shareholder proposals, independent direc-
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tors, and other prescriptions have failed to stifle managerial
abuses. This is the message of Part I.
Through most of the twentieth century, managerialism ap-
peared to be an inescapable consequence of the dispersion of
share ownership in tiny fractions among tens of thousands of
holders. But the last quarter of the century witnessed a dramatic
concentration of shareholdings in investment institu-
tions-principally pension funds, mutual funds, endowments,
and stock ownership plans. The holdings of these institutions
are so large that a manageable number of funds could feasibly
join hands to supervise managers in a new system of control that
might be called "investor capitalism." This is the thesis of Part
II.
The remainder of the Article explores the reasons why funds
have not exerted their potential power and speculates on the
consequences of institutions' exerting it. Part III examines the
motivation of institutions and their components. One problem is
the dilemma of "collective goods." A portfolio manager gains
nothing for himself by improving the profitability of General
Motors (for instance), since the gains will be shared by all the
other portfolio managers who are in competition with the one
that spent his own time and money in producing the improve-
ment. Another problem is the pressure that fund sponsors can
exert on portfolio managers. The managers of General Motors,
for example, might press trustees of General Motors' pension
fund to support the managers of takeover targets, even though
the fund would benefit from the bid's success.
If institutional managers were to surmount the dilemma of
collective goods, the pressure of sponsors, and other motiva-
tional impediments, they would confront a regime of federal se-
curities regulation that is indifferent in some respects, and hos-
tile in others, toward investors' exercise of power over managers.
These impediments are reviewed in Part IV.
Part V offers speculations on the consequences that might
flow from institutional investors' exercise of their potential
power over corporate managers. At best, this change might ac-
celerate the removal of inefficient managers and block the waste
of resources on takeover battles. At worst, it might lead to sacri-
ficing long-term goals for short-term gains, or to enhancing the
entrenchment of enterprise managers through alliances between
them and institutional managers. A few revisions of legislation
and case law would enhance the probability of beneficial
consequences.
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In conclusion, the Article proposes changes in public and pri-
vate attitudes and amendments of laws and regulations to ad-
vance the cause of "investor capitalism."
I. THE RISE AND THE FLAW OF MANAGERIALISM
In the capitalism decried by Marx and extolled by
Schumpeter, enterprises were managed by owners-that is, by
people who were expected by law and custom to receive the
greatest benefits and to bear the greatest risks of the undertak-
ing.1 These are the participants whom contemporary financial
economists call "residual claimants."' 2 This system, which may
be appropriately identified as "owner capitalism," continues to
flourish in millions of small enterprises, and a few large ones,
organized as simple partnerships or close corporations.
A discriminating observation of the contemporary scene will
reveal that this ancestral form of capitalism has given way to a
deviant form, which has some merits and some demerits that
distinguish it from its ancestor.
A. The Rise of Managerialism
In the great majority of the largest enterprises, owner capital-
ism has been superseded by another system in which enterprises
are managed by executives who hold very small fractions of total
equity and who are virtually autonomous because they use the
1. Marx did not use the word "capitalism," but dwelt on the behavior of the "capital-
ist," who appears to have been a single individual who united the functions of owner,
executive, middle management, and foreman. See K. MARx, CAPITAL 197-221, 331-41,
822-34 (1st American ed. 1906) (1st ed. 1867). Marx made no reference to corporations,
nor to a divergence between the interests of owners and managers, although Adam Smith
had called attention to this divergence 91 years earlier. See 2 A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 211-44 (1934) (1st ed. 1776). Schumpeter distinguished between "en-
trepreneurial" capitalism, in which the owner-managers are risk-taking innovators, and
"bourgeois" capitalism, in which the owner-managers are risk-shunning conservators, but
took no notice of the division between owners and managers. J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM,
SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 73, 131-42 (3d ed. 1950). For a description of this "tradi-
tional" system and its contrast with modern managerialism, see A. CHANDLER, THE VISI-
BLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BusiNEss 15-78, 377-500 (1977).
2. See Fama & Jensen, Agency.Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327
(1983); Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976).
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proxy system to cast the votes of most of the other
shareholders.3
Although the contemporary literature of management favors
the election of some directors characterized as "outside" or
"nonmanagement," it plainly assumes that these directors are
chosen by incumbent officers or directors, rather than by
shareholders.'
This system has become known as "managerial capitalism" or,
more briefly, as "managerialism." ' One writer has called it "own-
erless capitalism."' Under this system, the executives' shares of
ownership are very small in relation to the resources that they
administer, so that they have more to gain from manipulation of
their positions of power than from the benefits of shareholding.7
The 1968 edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica offered the
observation that "capitalist managers under big business parallel
the position of managers of trusts and factories in the Soviet
Union. Both hold power by virtue of office rather than of
ownership." 8
3. E. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER 53-113 (1981). For the diver-
gence of ownership and management a half-century earlier, see A. BERLE & G. MEANS,
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). See also R. GORDON, BUSINESS
LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION' 128-34, 143-46 (1961); R. LARNER, MANAGEMENT
CONTROL AND THE LARGE CORPORATION 19-21 (1970). For a recent recapitulation of the
literature of managerialism, see E. EPSTEIN, WHO OWNS THE CORPORATION? MANAGEMENT
VS. SHAREHOLDERS 1-16 (1986). Cf. I. KRISTOL, Two CHEERS FOR CAPITALISM 20 (1978):
"And though management will talk piously, when it serves its purposes, about its obliga-
tions to the stockholders, the truth is that it prefers to have as little to do with them as
possible, since their immediate demands are only too likely to conflict with manage-
ment's long-term corporate plans."
Two recent authors, basing their observations on British as well as United States en-
terprises, have taken a slightly different view of the power structure in large corpora-
tions. See J. ScoTr, CAPITALIST PROPERTY AND FINANCIAL POWER: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 1-6 (1986) (arguing that large corporations are
controlled by constellations of institutional investors and lenders); M. USEEM, THE INNER
CIRCLE 175-79 (1984) (contending that executives are effectively supervised by an inter-
locking directorate of executives from other companies, who impose standards of behav-
ior that are prevalent in the community of large corporation executives).
4. See THE CONFERENCE BOARD, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: ROLE, SELEC-
TION AND LEGAL STATUS OF THE BOARD 135 (1973) (report written by J. Bacon and J.
Brown) [hereinafter DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES]; Committee on Corporate Laws, Section of
Corp., Banking & Business Law, Am. Bar Ass'n, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33
Bus. LAW. 1595, 1619-28 (1978) [hereinafter Guidebook].
5. A. CHANDLER, supra note 1; E. HERMAN, supra note 3, at 9; R. MARRIS, THE Eco-
NOMIC THEORY OF "MANAGERIAL" CAPITALISM 1-45 (1964); Mason, The Apologetics of
"Managerialism," 31 J. Bus. 1 (1958).
6. E. EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 41.
7. See Coffee, Shareholders versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85
MICH. L. REV. 1 (1986).
8. Capitalism, in 4 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 839, 844 (1968).
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The separation of management from beneficial ownership has
progressed through phases that one commentator has aptly
characterized as "four stages of capitalism."9 In the first stage,
owners were managers. In the second stage, ownership became
dispersed among myriads of passive shareholders who retained
the legal authority to choose managers but neglected to exercise
it because of the effort and expense that would be required to
inform themselves and to mobilize their fellows. In the third
stage, many of the beneficial owners entrusted their funds to in-
vestment companies and trust companies, thereby losing even
the legal right to vote directly in the affairs of the enterprises in
which their funds were invested. In the fourth stage, a large
fraction of individuals' savings was shifted from funds chosen by
the savers to pension funds chosen by the savers' employers or
unions. 0 At this stage, the beneficial owners were triply removed
from decisionmaking in the enterprises that employed their
savings.
Managerial capitalism demonstrated some advantages over
owner capitalism." It permitted enterprises to grow to enormous
dimensions, which never could have been reached if the number
of shareholders had been limited to numbers that could partici-
pate effectively in governance." It opened executive positions to
competition based more on merit than on family relationship to
major shareholders.13
At the same time, managerialism revealed a vital defect, which
might be obviated by another kind of capitalism if appropriate
changes were made in the legal and political environment of in-
stitutional investors.
B. The Flaw in Managerialism
Managerial capitalism has revealed, alongside its manifest vir-
tues, a kind of "immune deficiency." Like other manipulators of
power, from kings to corporals and from popes to professors,
managers are inclined to serve their own interests at the expense
9. Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Management
Treatises, 94 HARv. L. REv. 561 (1981).
10. R. IPPOLITO, PENSIONS, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 163-64 (1986).
11. See A. CHANDLER, supra note 1; see also Werner, Management, Stock Market
and Corporate Reform: Berle and Means Reconsidered, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 388, 402-05
(1977).
12. See A. CHANDLER, supra note 1, at 455-83.
13. Id. at 8-10, 464-68.
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of their constituents, and managerial capitalism contains no ade-
quate restraints on their inclination.
During the first half of the twentieth century, the self-serving
antics of managers seemed relatively innocuous, consisting
chiefly of compensating themselves at levels that exceeded the
market value of their services but did not significantly diminish
returns to shareholders.14 There were also occasional instances of
executives' hanging on to positions of power after their compe-
tencies had diminished, like Sewell Avery in Montgomery Ward
& Co.'5
Apologists of managerialism could plausibly contend that the
costs of overcompensation and inefficiency were minute in pro-
portion to shareholders' total returns, and that the threat of
takeovers would keep them within reasonable bounds. If the
costs became significant, these apologists theorized, better man-
agers would take over through stock purchases. 6
In the 1970s and '80s, as takeover bids proliferated, managers
found ways to frustrate them with defensive tactics that ac-
quired colorful sobriquets like "greenmail," "shark repellents,"
and "poison pills." By these devices, managers not only deprived
their shareholders of millions of dollars of potential gains,"7 but
also insulated themselves from the discipline of future tender of-
fers. The directors of Marshall Field, for example, denied their
shareholders the chance to realize a gain of approximately 100
percent, amounting in the aggregate to more than one hundred
million dollars. 18
14. See R. GORDON, supra note 3, at 280-81; R. LARNER, supra note 3, at 33-61.
15. Avery Holds the Fort, Bus. WEEK, June 26, 1948, at 24.
16. The classic exposition of these views was made by Henry Manne in Mergers and
the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965); for a more recent recapit-
ulation, see Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259
(1982).
17. See Bradley, Desai & Kim, The Rationale Behind Interfirm Tender Offers: In-
formation or Synergy?, 11 J. FIN. EcoN. 183 (1983); Sprinkel, The Real Issue in Corpo-
rate Takeovers, Wall St. J., July 17, 1987, at 18, col. 3.
18. Carter-Hawley-Hale (CHH) proposed in 1978 to pay cash and securities valued at
$42 a share for all of the company's nine-million-odd shares, which had fluctuated be-
tween $17 and $21 for many months until about three weeks before the CHH proposal.
MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 2591 (1978). After the proposal was rejected, the shares
quickly fell to earlier levels, MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 2606 (1979), reaching a low of
$12.75 in 1980, MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 3866 (1981). In 1982, they rose slowly but
never passed $30 until taken over by BATUS Inc. at $45.90 in June 1982. MOODY'S IN-
DUSTRIAL MANUAL 4014 (1982). The board's action was sustained against a shareholder's
attack in Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. Ill. 1980), aff'd 646
F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). For a critical evaluation of
the board's conduct, see the dissenting aspects of the opinion by Cudahy, Circuit Judge,
Panter, 646 F.2d at 299.
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The directors of Disney paid over 300 million dollars to get rid
of one takeover bidder and more than seven million dollars for a
defensive maneuver to defeat a second.19 A number of legal and
economic commentators called for some brake on defensive tac-
tics.20 Even in the absence of a takeover threat, General Motors
paid Ross Perot more than 700 million dollars-over twice the
market value of his shares-for his shares plus his agreement to
leave the board of directors and stop criticizing the manage-
ment.2 1 According to one successful investment manager, "The
disenfranchisement of all shareholders by rapacious manage-
ments with kept boards of directors-some paid consultants to
the very same corporations-has cost shareholders billions upon
billions. ' 22 These massive diversions of enterprise resources
seem likely to affect not only shareholders, but also employees,
consumers, and communities, which share in varying degrees the
affluence and the penury of enterprises.
There are, of course, critics who contend that resources are
wasted less in resistance to takeover offers than in the tender
offers themselves, which lead to overindebtedness and improvi-
dent liquidations.23 According to these observers, many take-
overs are driven by the desire of the acquisitors' managers to
enlarge their empires and their perks, with slight regard for the
returns of their investors.24
One need not determine whether takeovers are predominantly
beneficial or predominantly detrimental; there are probably
19. The first payment was to buy the stock of the bidder at a price that gave him a
$59 million profit; the second was an indemnity paid to rescind a merger agreement that
had been made to fend off a second takeover bid. See The High Price Disney Paid To
Save Itself, Bus. WEEK, June 25, 1984, at 32, 32-33, Magnet, No More Mickey Mouse at
Disney, FORTUNE, Dec. 10, 1984, at 56.
20. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Respond-
ing to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover
Bids, Defensive Tactics and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. LAW. 1733 (1981); Easter-
brook & Jarrell, Do Targets Gain from Defeating Tender Offers?, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 277
(1984); Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a
Merge?, 28 J.L. & EcON. 151 (1985).
21. GM Boots Perot, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 15, 1986, at 56.
22. M. SOSNOFF, SILENT INVESTOR, SILENT LOSER 6 (1986).
23. See E. HERMAN, supra note 3, at 100-01; Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's
Boardroom; An Update After One Year, 36 Bus. LAW. 1017 (1981); Lipton, Takeover
Bids in the Target's Boardroom: A Response to Professors Easterbrook and Fischel, 55
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231 (1980); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus.
LAW. 101 (1979); Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for
Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1983).
24. One investment manager has described "corporate managements who feather
their nests and make mindless acquisitions only so that they can reward themselves with
higher salaries and longer-range Gulfstream jets." M. SOSNOFF, supra note 22, at 42.
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some of each kind.25 Under either hypothesis, some enterprise
managers are consuming resources on a grand scale to protect or
to aggrandize their own positions.
A few observers contend that the battles between bidders and
targets increase "shareholder wealth," in spite of the enormous
expenditures involved, because they result in higher aggregate
market prices for securities.2 6 This argument is not completely
persuasive because it seems to confuse price inflation with in-
creases in wealth and to ignore the fact that a good deal of the
markup in prices goes into the pockets of arbitrageurs,
2 7 of
whom Ivan Boesky provided the most spectacular example.28
The investing public owns the same assets after the takeover
battle as it owned before but has contributed additional savings
for the privilege, with much of the difference going to arbi-
trageurs, lawyers, and investment bankers, who brought about
the higher securities prices. Even if the increase in the price of
the assets reflects some enhancement of their profitability under
new management, policymakers should explore the possibility
that the same enhancement could be produced less expensively
and more reliably by other mechanisms.
The spectacle of enormous expenditures of executive effort on
battles for control, and of the capricious distribution of the capi-
tal gains that result from them, has led to a widespread opinion
that the takeover wars are intolerable. In this v3in, the chairman
of the American Bar Association's Committee on Corporate
Laws declared:
The unfriendly tender mania has provoked unseemly be-
havior by both antagonists. The surprise raid and the
front-end loaded offer tilt the rules unfairly. Greenmail,
the piranha-like Pacman defense, the poison pill, the
golden parachute have added spice to our vocabulary but
brought us no honor. We should recognize that our cor-
25. For an exhaustive litany of complaints against takeover offenses and defenses, see
Impact of Corporate Takeovers: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985)
[hereinafter Impact].
26. See, e.g., Jensen, Takeovers, folklore and science, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec.
1984, at 109.
27. See Williams, What's Legal-and What's Not, FORTUNE, Dec. 22, 1986, at 36;
Worthy, Wall Street's Spreading Scandal, FORTUNE, Dec. 22, 1986, at 26, 28-29.
28. See Pauly, The SEC Bags Ivan Boesky, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 24, 1986, at 68; Russell,
The Fall of a Wall Street Superstar, TnME, Nov. 24, 1986, at 71; Ivan Boesky's $100
Million Mistake, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 24, 1986, at 9.
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porate behavior is simply below the norm which over the
long run the good sense of the Congress will tolerate.29
In 1987, members of Congress voiced similar sentiments in a
flurry of bills designed to restrain the efflorescence of takeover
battles-creeping takeovers, junk bonds, unequal voting rights,
greenmail, and poison pills.30
Although there is no consensus on measures to be taken, there
is a widespread consensus that ways must be found to achieve at
lower cost whatever enhancements of profitability emerge from
the takeover wars. The waste of enterprise resources is detri-
mental not only to people who think of themselves as sharehold-
ers, but also to countless other indirect beneficiaries -pension-
ers whose funds are invested in shares, students and scholars
who depend on university endowments, innumerable citizens
whose lives are enriched by the beneficence of foundations.
Waste also affects employees, consumers, and ambient commu-
nities, whose opportunities to bargain for better treatment are
narrowed when enterprises are less productive.
C. Patches on the Flaw
The twentieth century has witnessed a parade of efforts to
patch managerialism's vital flaw. A review of the most notable of
these efforts may cast some light on the endemic character of
managerialism's immune deficiency.
1. Shareholder derivative suits- The most conspicuous of
the extant deterrents of managerial abuses have been sharehold-
ers' derivative suits, but their deficiencies have been exposed in
law review articles too numerous to cite. At best, derivative suits
29. Subak, Chairman's Message, 40 Bus. LAW. xiv-xv (1984).
30. See S. 78, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (seeking to regulate greenmail and creep-
ing takeovers) (sponsored by Senators Metzenbaum, Glenn, Mikulski, and Sarbanes); S.
227, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (seeking to regulate creeping takeovers, duration of
tender offers, golden parachutes, greenmail, and two-tier offers) (sponsored by Senator
D'Amato); S. 336, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (seeking to regulate creeping takeovers)
(sponsored by Senators Kassebaum, Nickles, Glenn, Exon, Boren, and Danforth); S. 634,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (seeking to regulate anticompetitive takeovers, greenmail,
creeping takeovers, unequal voting rights, poison pills, golden parachutes, two-tier offers,
junk bonds, and leveraged buy-outs) (sponsored by Senator Specter); H.R. 685, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (seeking to regulate junk bonds) (sponsored by Representative
Richardson); H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (seeking to regulate creeping acqui-
sitions, junk bonds, delay in disclosure, unequal voting rights, golden parachutes, and




are likely to succeed only when mismanagement is obvious;
judges will not second-guess directors in close cases."1 At worst,
derivative suits are abused by lawyers who prosecute them more
for their settlement value than to penalize or deter
mismanagement.3 2
2. Shareholder democracy- In the 1950s, a flurry of publi-
cations and agency rulings focused on activating the rank and
file of individual shareholders under the banner of "shareholder
democracy."3 3 A similar concept surfaced in a pair of bills intro-
duced in Congress in 1980, optimistically entitled "Protection of
Shareholders Rights Act of 1980" and "Corporate Democracy
Act of 1980.""4
This idea was doomed from the start by the inability of indi-
vidual shareholders to inform themselves about corporate affairs
at a cost in time and money that would bear a reasonable rela-
tionship to what they might hope to gain. By 1980, the effective
mobilization of individual shareholders had become mathemati-
cally impossible in many corporations because of the shift of
shareholdings from individuals to institutions.3 3
In an early recognition of the shift df ownership from individ-
uals to institutions, Nader, Green, and Seligman proposed in the
1970s an ingenious variation of the shareholder democracy con-
31. See Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and
a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 278 (1981); Dent, The Power
of Directors To Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?,
75 Nw. U.L. REV. 96 (1980). For a concise summary, see E. EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 17-
24.
32. Coffee, Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Essay on Steering Between
Scylla and Charybdis, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 789, 804 (1984); Coffee, The Unfaithful
Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, LAW & CoTrrEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1985, at 5, 13-33; cf. Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Resolution of
Shareholder Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 60 B.U.L. REV. 542 (1980) (showing a
high rate of settlement of shareholders' suits with modest benefits to corporations). The
significance of Jones's study is limited by the lack of a separation of shareholders' deriv-
ative suits from shareholders' class action suits.
33. F. EMERSON & F. LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A BROADER OUTLOOK FOR
CORPORATIONS (1954); L. GILBERT, DIVIDENDS AND DEMOCRACY (1956); Caplin, Proxies,
Annual Meetings and Corporate Democracy: The Lawyer's Role, 37 VA. L. REV. 653
(1951); Caplin, Shareholder Nominations of Directors: A Program for Fair Corporate
Suffrage, 39 VA. L. REV. 141 (1953); Garrett, Attitudes on Corporate Democracy-A Crit-
ical Analysis, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 310 (1956). For a more recent discussion of the concept,
see Schwartz, Shareholder Democracy: A Reality or Chimera?, CAL. MGMT. REV., Spring
1983, at 53.
34. These were, respectively, S. 2567, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), known as the Met-
zenbaum bill, and H.R. 7010, 96th Cong. 2d Ses. (1980), known as the Rosenthal bill. An
analysis of both appears in STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN
AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCouNTABILrTY 725-34 (Comm.
Print 1980) [hereinafter CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILrrY].
35. See R. IPPOLITO, supra note 10, at 11.
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cept. They suggested that the "beneficial" owners of investment
companies and pension funds should tell the investment manag-
ers how to vote the shares in their portfolios.3 6 The same idea
was put forward rather tentatively by some witnesses, and re-
jected very firmly by others, in the 1986 pension fund hearings
conducted by Congressman Wirth.3 7 The beneficiaries of these
funds seem even less likely to have useful ideas about the con-
duct of portfolio enterprises than direct shareholders of
enterprises. 8
The hope that individual share owners could effectively moni-
tor the managers of large enterprises no longer seems to be en-
tertained seriously by anyone. A revival of the shareholder de-
mocracy idea was suggested by the title of a 1987 proposal for a
House Concurrent Resolution, "To express the sense of the Con-
gress with respect to the need for shareholder democracy in the
rules administered and supervised by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission," but its operative clauses were limited to
urging the SEC to preserve equality of voting rights. 9 It con-
tained no provisions for facilitating action by shareholders, ei-
ther individual or institutional.
3. Independent Directors- In the late 1970s and the 1980s,
most of the critics of managerialism abandoned hope for share-
holder democracy and turned their attention to installing direc-
tors who would be free of the conflicts of interest that affect ex-
ecutives. The Conference Board presented arguments for the
presence of "outside directors" on boards, and even for . an
36. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 128 (1976).
37. Pension Funds in the Capital Markets: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Tele-
communications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) [hereinafter Pension Funds]. Robert J.
Scott, executive director of the Public Employees Retirement Association of Colorado,
thought that fund beneficiaries should have votes, but that it would be difficult to ar-
range, id. at 31; Professor Tamar Frankel of Boston University thought that pass-
through voting should be allowed, and that it might work in small funds, id. at 77; Roger
C. Bransford, on behalf of the Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans, de-
clared that pass-through voting would be prohibitively expensive, id. at 60.
38. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE CORPORATION: THE
CASE FOR THE FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORATIONS 203 (1976). Recognizing the
improbability that beneficial owners would have useful knowledge about portfolio enter-
prises, the Nader group proposed in an earlier draft that the beneficial owners of funds
should elect policy boards to direct the voting of fund shares. Id. at 203-04. This sugges-
tion disappeared in the revision entitled TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION. R. NADER, M.
GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 36. Ronnie J. Straw, representing the Communication
Workers of America, testified in the pension fund hearings that labor unions (presuma-
bly through their officers) should participate along with employers in management of
pension funds, including the voting of portfolio shares. Pension Funds, supra note 37, at
43.
39. H.R. Con. Res. 42, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
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"overwhelmingly outside board. '40 The Corporate Director's
Guidebook of the American Bar Association's Corporate Laws
Committee advocated that key committees of the board should
be composed exclusively of "nonmanagement" directors."' A
keystone of the American Law Institute's successive drafts of
Principles of Corporate Governance was the requirement or rec-
ommendation that large public companies have specified propor-
tions of directors who would be "free of any significant relation-
ships with the corporation's senior executives." '
The idea of requiring publicly held corporations to provide
themselves with independent directors is excellent, but it will
not alleviate the vices of managerial egoism until independence
is measured by a more stringent criterion than the mere freedom
from employment by the corporation, from a family relationship
with executives, and from equity ownership in a supplier of
goods or services to the corporation. "' Executives can easily find
directors who are neither subordinates, relatives, nor suppliers,
who will support almost anything that the executives propose,
and who will resign in extreme cases rather than oppose the ex-
ecutives who have invited them to the board." They have been
given a powerful incentive to select directors of this kind by a
recent extension of the business judgment rule that gives a pre-
sumption of validity to conflict-of-interest transactions when in-
dependent directors have approved them. In particular, courts
defer to the opinion of "independent directors" that a derivative
suit should be dismissed because it is not in the best interest of
the corporation.45 In a few cases, the approval of directors who
40. DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES, supra note 4, at 28-71, 62-63 (1973). The Conference
Board is an association of executives of large corporations.
41. Guidebook, supra note 4, at 1625-27.
42. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS § 3.03 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982) [hereinafter T.D. 1]. The first draft con-
tained a provision requiring that large, publicly held corporations have boards with a
majority of such directors. In 1984, the majority norm was demoted to a "recommenda-
tion of [good] corporate practice," but a requirement of independent directors on the
auditing committee was retained. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 3.04, 3.03 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1984).
43. These are the principal elements of independence as defined by T.D. 1, supra
note 42, § 1.24.
44. See Cox & Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and
Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 83;
M. SOSNOFF, supra note 22, at 170-74, 182-83.
45. See Block, Prussin & Wachtel, Dismissal of Derivative Actions Under the Busi-
ness Judgment Rule: Zapata One Year Later, 38 Bus. LAW. 401 (1983); Brown, The Busi-
ness Judgment Rule: Burks v. Lasker and Other Recent Developments, 6 CORP. L.J. 453
(1981); Sparks, Recent Developments in Substantive Business Judgment Rule, 61 N.C.L.
REV. 534 (1983); Veasey, Seeking a Safe Harbor from Judicial Scrutiny of Directors'
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are "independent" in the same vague sense has been held to re-
lieve executives of the burden of proving fairness in transactions
between themselves and their corporations."' Under these condi-
tions, "independent" directors resemble, in Victor Brudney's
simile, the facade of a Potemkin Village."'
In the 1970s, a few commentators proposed to mitigate the
supremacy of managers by authorizing government agencies to
appoint one or more directors.4 8 Since this suggestion has not
attracted any further adherents, its obvious complexities will not
be explored here.
4. Specific Prohibitions- During the 1980s, protesters
against the abuses of the tender-offer wars often proposed new
rules and laws to penalize acquisitors' tactics, such as creeping
acquisitions and two-tier offers, or defensive devices, such as
golden parachutes, greenmail, poison pills, and unequal voting
rights."9 One such measure was enacted in the form of a penalty
tax on unusual termination benefits.5
These proposals are unlikely to curb abuses, so long as the
dynamics of management power remain fundamentally un-
changed. If managers are forbidden to pay themselves cash ben-
efits, they can sell themselves parts of the enterprise, or even the
whole enterprise in a "leveraged buy out." If they are forbidden
to issue preferred shares with discretionary features (a common
form of "poison pill"), they can issue discretionary debt obliga-
tions. If they are forbidden to pay high cash prices ("greenmail")
for shares, they can exchange the shares for a company as-
set-an oil field or a product line. The curbing of abuses can be
achieved only by giving investors the effective power over man-
agers that corporation laws were originally designed to provide.
Business Decisions-An Analytical Framework for Litigation Strategy and Counselling
Directors, 37 Bus. LAW. 1247 (1982).
46. See Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1979); Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d
218 (Del. 1976). This view was adopted by The American Law Institute. PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.02(b) (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1986).
47. Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95
HARv. L. REv. 597 (1982).
48. C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 159 (1975); Moscow, The Independent Director,
28 Bus. LAW. 9, 11-12 (1972).
49. For a list of the congressional proposals of early 1987, see supra note 30.
50. 26 U.S.C. § 4999 (Supp. IV 1986) (subtitled "Golden parachut payments").
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II. THE INVESTORIAL ALTERNATIVE
In the 1980s, a new approach to the control of managerialism
became plausible as a result of the concentration of sharehold-
ings in the hands of institutional investors and changing atti-
tudes of institutions toward shareholder activism. These devel-
opments, and their relation to the dynamics of enterprise
governance in some other countries, are discussed in the
paragraphs that follow.
A. The Institutional Eruption
The immensity of aggregate institutional holdings of enter-
prise equities is well known. What makes these holdings signifi-
cant, however, is not their aggregate immensity, but the propor-
tions of ownership that they represent in particular corporations
and the numbers of institutions that make up these proportions.
The reported proportion of equities held by institutions rose
from about 16 percent in 1960 to about 34 percent in 1980, and
was expected by some observers to rise to fifty percent by the
year 2000.51 If nonreporting institutions were included, the per-
centage may have already passed 50 in the 1980s.12
While the potential power of institutional shareholders was
growing, the power of individual shareholders was shrinking,
since individuals' fraction of corporate equities necessarily fell as
the institutional fraction rose.53 The possibility that individual
shareholders would act to defend their interests became more
and more remote.
51. R. IPPOLITO, supra note 10, at 157; Pension Funds, supra note 37, at 3 (statement
by Congressman Donald E. Luken).
52. NYSE FACT BOOK 55 (1985). The New York Stock Exchange estimated that
35.4% of all NYSE-listed shares were held by "major institutional investors" in 1980,
and that if all institutional categories were included, the institutional fraction of NYSE-
listed shares would pass 50%.
53. According to Federal Reserve System figures, "household" ownership of equities
declined from 86% in 1961 to 66% in 1984, while holdings of insurance companies, pen-
sion funds, and mutual funds rose from 11% to 29% over the same period. The only
other significant class of holders was "foreign," amounting to three percent in 1962 and
five percent in 1984. BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FED. RESERVE Sys., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS;
FINANCIAL ASSETS AND LIABILITIES YEAR-END, 1961-84, at 35-36 (1985) [hereinafter FLOW
OF FUNDS]. The percentages of institutional holdings indicated by these figures are lower
than in other reports; the figures are derived from different sources and reflect "all equi-
ties," rather than equities listed on particular exchanges or those selected for coverage in
an investment manual.
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Institutional holdings are not, of course, equally distributed
among enterprises, and the power of institutional investors de-
pends in large part on the level of holdings and the number of
holders in particular companies. For institutions to exert influ-
ence in any particular enterprise, it is necessary not only that
the institutions hold a large proportion of the shares, but also
that the number of institutions involved be small enough to fa-
cilitate collaboration among them. In order to find out how often
these conditions coexist, an analysis was made of the holdings
reported by 100 randomly chosen issuers of actively traded
equities."
Institutional holdings in the 100 companies ranged from over
90 percent at the high end to a little more than 6 percent at the
low end.5 5 Thirty of the 100 enterprises were owned by institu-
tions to the extent of more than 60 percent. Sixty of the 100
were owned by institutions to the extent of 40 percent or more.
The distributions are tabulated in Table 1.
TABLE 1
Proportions of shares held by institutional investors
Proportion of shares
held by institutions 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% 80-100%
Number of companies
so held 7 33 30 29 1
The number of institutions holding these proportions of equi-
ties is also important, because the ease of collaboration among
54. The 100 companies were chosen from the 944 companies reported in MOODY'S
HANDBOOK OF COMMON STOCKS (Winter 1986-87 ed.) [hereinafter MOODY'S]. These com-
panies were characterized by the publisher as companies whose stocks have "high inves-
tor interest," MOODY'S, supra, at 2; they were all listed on the New York Stock Exchange.
The fact that they had high investor interest suggests that they may have had higher
institutional participation than a random sample of all publicly traded equities would
have. The institutional investors, whose holdings in the 944 issuers were reported by the
Handbook, included about 1412 domestic and foreign investment companies, 1100 insur-
ance companies, 250 national banks, 442 investment advisers, pension funds and other
managers of $100 million or more, and 239 colleges. MOODY'S, supra, at 7a. In view of the
small size of the sample, and its possible bias, it should be regarded as suggestive, rather
than definitive, of the potential influence of institutional investors on publicly held
enterprises.
55. At the high end, Tektronix, Inc., reported 90% institutional holdings; at the low
end, Bic and Unilever reported between six and seven percent institutional holdings. See
MOODY'S, supra note 54.
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institutions varies inversely with the number of institutions that
must collaborate to attain a critical mass. For 66 of the 100 com-
panies, the number of institutional investors was no more than
200. In eighty-four of the 100, the number of institutional inves-
tors was no more than 400.56 The distributions are exhibited in
Table 2.
TABLE 2
Number of institutional investors per company
Number of institutional
investors per company 0-200 201-400 401-600 601-800 801-1000
Percent of companies
with these numbers of
institutional investors 66 18 10 4 2
The key to institutional power, however, is the concurrence of
a high proportion of institutional ownership with a small num-
ber of institutional owners. When that happens, institutional in-
vestors can organize an influential block with relative ease. In
one of the 100 companies in the sample, 80 percent of the shares
were held by no more than 400 institutions. Of the 30 enter-
prises that were more than 60 percent owned by institutions, 12
had no more than 200 institutional holders, and 20 had no more
than 400. These distributions are exhibited in Table 3.
56. Forty-three of the 100 enterprises had no more than 100 institutional investors,
89 had no more than 500, and none had more than 1000. The companies in the sample
with more than 500 institutional holders were General Motors (920), Philip Morris (830),
Citicorp (606), Ameritech (604), Union Pacific (581), Allied-Signal (547), Ford Motor
(533), Aetna (528), Dun & Bradstreet (530), Raytheon (513), and Warner-Lambert (502).
Id.
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TABLE 3
Number of companies with various numbers of institutional
investors and proportions of institutional shareholdings
Proportion of institutional holdings
0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% 80-100% Totals
Numbers of 801-1000 0 0 1 1 0 2
institutional
investors 601-800 1 2 0 1 0 4
per company
401-600 0 0 3 8 0 11
201-400 0 4 5 7 1 17
0-200 6 27 21 12 0 66
Totals 7 33 30 29 1 100
While institutional investors were increasing their holdings,
they were also increasing their separate and collective activism
in opposing the adoption of shark repellent and poison pill de-
fenses by the targets of takeover bids. In 1985, a number of pub-
lic pension funds formed the Council of Institutional Investors
in order to coordinate institutional resistance to defensive ma-
neuvers like the Disney greenmail payment.17 In 1987, several of
the largest pension funds joined in sixty shareholder proposals
to require that poison pills be submitted .to the vote of share-
holders,68 and a proposal in one company to rescind a poison pill
that had been adopted.59 The proposals for submission of poison
pills to shareholders received 40 percent or more of the votes
cast in 4 companies.60
57. Pension Funds, supra note 37, at 27.
58. Franklin, Down, But Not Out: Pill Challenges Fail; But Get Significant Num-
bers, N.Y.L.J., May 28, 1987, at 5, col. 3.
59. Anders, International Paper, Major Holders Press their Fight over Validity of
'Poison Pill', Wall St. J., Apr. 2, 1987, at 6, col. 1; Anders, Institutional Holders Irked by
'Poison Pill', Wall St. J., Mar. 10, 1987, at 6, col. 1.
60. Franklin, supra note 58.
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In at least one instance, institutional shareholders of a pro-
spective bidder joined in protest against the launching of a take-
over bid."
The growing power of institutional investors and the shrinking
power of individual investors suggest the possibility, and per-
haps even the inevitability, of a system of corporate governance
in which institutional investors would take a leading role in de-
termining the purposes for which major corporations will be
managed. I call it "investor capitalism."
B. The Concept of Investor Capitalism
"Investor capitalism" would recapture the essential genius of
capitalism by restoring primacy to the interests of the suppliers
of capital. This primacy is not only the idea from which the
name of capitalism is derived; it is also the characteristic that,
according to the traditional justifications of capitalism, makes it
work."2
The word "investor" is added to signify that the interests of
the suppliers of capital are defended not only by the sharehold-
ers who are beneficial owners, but also by the institutional inves-
tors-pension funds, mutual funds, trustees, and founda-
tions-to whom individual savers have entrusted the
management of their funds.
Under investor capitalism, the great majority of decisions that
managers make would be the same as under managerialism.
Their decisions would be different only when managers' and
shareholders' interests diverge. The most conspicuous diver-
gences during the 1980s arose in some instances of target manag-
ers' resistance to takeover proposals, and some instances of bid-
ders' executives' decisions to launch takeover bids. Less
conspicuous instances of divergent interests have involved man-
agers who had become inefficient but hung tenaciously to their
positions, and managers who procured compensation far beyond
the amounts necessary to motivate their best efforts.6
Investor power might be asserted with varying degrees of in-
tensity. At a minimum, institutional investors would organize to
61. Kilman, Some of Interco's Shareholders Oppose Its $500 Million Accord To Buy
Lane Co., Wall St. J., Apr. 1, 1987, at 16, col. 3.
62. For capsules of conventional wisdom on the subject, see Capitalism, supra note 8,
at 839-45; Sombart, Capitalism, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 195-208
(1935). For a classic rationale, see J. SCHUMPETER, supra note 1.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
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give managers their opinions on payments of greenmail and bo-
nuses, as they did in the winter of 1986-87 with regard to Gen-
eral Motors." At a further stage, they would organize to vote
together on charter amendments that facilitate or impede take-
overs, on officers' compensation plans, and on shareholder pro-
posals.5 Ultimately, they would organize to nominate and elect
directors of their choice.
Shareholder democracy-whatever is left of it-would be rein-
forced by investor capitalism, because institutional investors
would supply sufficient expertise to analyze and identify share-
holder interests and would exercise leadership in organizing vot-
ing blocks that comprise individuals as well as institutions.
Managers would continue to operate enterprises without inter-
ference by directors or shareholders, so long as they manage effi-
ciently and avoid conflicts of interest. They would not be di-
rected from above, as they often are in a subsidiary. But they
would be checked by investor-oriented directors and by the
votes of shareholders when their actions were contrary to inves-
tors' interests. In the ultimate phase of investor capitalism, fun-
damental differences between the views of executives and inves-
tor-oriented directors would be resolved by removal of the
managers, rather than by resignations of the directors, as they
are under managerialism.
C. The New and the Old in Investor Capitalism
Investor capitalism is not a new invention, but a means of giv-
ing vitality to the system of governance that legislators have de-
creed from the birth of business corporations to the present day.
What is new about it is the adaptation of that legislative para-
digm to the structure of contemporary finance, in which savers
entrust most of their investment funds to financial in-
termediaries. Within this structure, the interests of savers must
be defended not by the individual savers, but by the financial
institutions to which savers delegate the function of monitoring
64. Levin, GM's Smith Gets Conditional Backing of Fund Managers in Wake of
Buyout, Wall St. J., Jan. 29, 1987, at 4, col. 5; One Big G.M. Holder Is Not Publicity-
Shy, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1986, at D2, col. 5. This meeting was followed by an agreement
for a continuing dialogue between GM management and institutional investors. Heard,
Pension funds and GM agree to establish advisory group, 4 IRRC CORP. GOVERNANCE
BULL. 46 (1987).
65. See, e.g., Anders, International Paper Co. Holders Reject Poison-Pill Challenge;
Earnings Triple, Wall St. J., Apr. 15, 1987, at 6, col. 1.
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the performance of the enterprises in which their savings are
invested.
Although there is no existing example of investor capitalism
that precisely fits this model, some of its elements may be found
in the system of corporate governance that prevails in one of the
more successful economic systems outside the United
States-that of West Germany. There, a majority of the shares
in the largest publicly held corporations are normally voted by
proxy-holders named by banks. These proxy-holders vote shares
that the banks own outright, shares that affiliated investment
companies hold for the benefit of other owners, and shares that
the banks hold as custodians for owners.66
Japanese enterprises also present alternatives to managerial
supremacy that differ markedly from those reported from other
countries. 67 The most celebrated system, as reported by observ-
ers in the 1970s and 1980s, is the one prevailing in the combines
known as kigyoshuban, which took the place of the zaibatsu
that were dissolved after World War II. The well-known names
of Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda are associated
with combines of this type. Each combine comprises several
companies in diverse lines of business; the Mitsubishi combine
included a bank, a casualty insurer, a "heavy industry" manu-
facturer, a glass company, an electric company, and others.6 In
these combines, most of the component companies own shares in
66. U. IMMENGA, BETEILIGUNGEN VON BANKEN IN ANDEREN WIRTSCHAFTSZWEIGEN 101-
05 (1978) ("Shareholdings of banks in other lines of business") [hereinafter IMMENGA
1978]; see also U. IMMENGA, AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, AKTIONARSINTERESSEN UND INSTITU-
TIONELLE ANLEGER (1971) ("Corporations, Shareholders' Interests and Institutional In-
vestors") [hereinafter IMMENGA 1971]. For briefer expositions in English, see Grossfeld,
Management and Control of Marketable Share Companies, 13 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA
CoMP. L. §§ 4-236 to 4-240, at 98-99 (1973) [hereinafter Grossfeld 1973]; Vagts, Re-
forming the "Modern" Corporation: Perspectives From The German, 80 HARV. L. REV.
23, 55-58 (1966) [hereinafter Vagts 1966]. For an exposition of the behavior of directors
and managers under the German system, see C. VOGEL, AKT1ENRECHT UND AKTIENWIR-
KLICHKEIT ORGANISATION UND AUFGABENTEILUNG VON VORSTAND UND AUFSICHTSRAT (1980)
("Corporation Law and Corporation Reality: Organization and Division of Tasks be-
tween Managers and Supervisory Council"). For a recent confirmation of banks' power
over enterprises, see Roth, German Banks Maintain Grip on Nation's Corporations,
Wall St. J., Sept. 30, 1987, at 32, col. 1.
67. Analyses in the English language of Japanese corporate governance are scarce.
The best that I have found is in J. ScoTT, supra note 3, at 159-97. Also useful are M.
SKULLY, JAPANESE CORPORATE STRUCTURE: SOME FACTORS IN ITS DEVELOPMENT (offset
typescript, Dryden Press, Sydney, Australia 1981) and Tatsuta, in Paris Colloquium on
Corporate Governance, 6 J. COMP. Bus. & CAP MET L. 199, 237 (1984). I have also drawn
on private conversations with various Japanese economists and analysts in international
colloquia, and correspondence with Professor Yoshimichi Hiraide of the University of
Nagoya.
68. J. SCOTT, supra note 3, at 189.
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other components so that the reciprocal holdings constitute con-
trolling blocks of shaies in each company. The managers of each
company pursue policies that satisfy the managers of the other
members of the combine, and especially the managers of the
principal bank. Although an American observer can imagine that
the policies of each component's managers would receive the ac-
quiescence of the managers of the other components, the prac-
tice seems to be just the opposite; each component's officers de-
fer to the consensus of the presidents of other components, or to
the views of the officers of the combine's principal bank.
A different control system exists in newer enterprises that are
not parts of a combine; these include the major automobile man-
ufacturers-Toyota and Nissan. In 1982, nineteen of the twenty
largest shareholders of Toyota, holding 48 percent of the shares,
were banks or insurance companies.8 9 Policies are dominated
chiefly by banks, exercising their influence as lenders, rather
than as shareholders.
In both systems of control, hegemonic influence was not ex-
erted by proxy contests or takeover bids, and rarely by cutting
off credit, but rather through a tradition of deference whereby
the chief executive of each enterprise yields to the opinions that
prevail among executives of affiliated companies or executives of
the company's principal banking connection."
The existence of alternative systems of governance in West
Germany and Japan is interesting not only because enterprises
of those countries appear to operate no less efficiently than those
of the United States, but also because they maintain their effi-
ciency without the "discipline" of takeover wars.
The German experience also suggests some of the kinds of
people that might be elected to governing boards under the lead-
ership of financial institutions." More than half of the board
members in a recent survey were characterized as "sharehold-
ers," either "large" or "small." The next largest category (21
percent) comprised representatives of government (bffentliche
Hand). Employees and officers of the banks amounted to only 9
percent and appeared in only one third of the companies sur-
69. J. ScorT, supra note 3, at 177.
70. This point was emphasized by correspondence of Professor Yoshimichi Hiraide of
the University of Nagoya.
71. The "board" in German corporations whose members are elected by the banks
(on behalf of shareholders) is a "supervisory council" (Aufsichtsrat), which hires and
fires the members of the "managing board" (Vorstand). For a fuller explanation, see




veyed. "Experts," including accountants, lawyers, and scientists,
filled about 5 percent of the seats. Representatives of suppliers
and customers amounted to about one percent of all members.72
If institutional investors in the United States were to nomi-
nate directors of their choice, they could find qualified candi-
dates among individual shareholders, their own officers or em-
ployees,7" lawyers, accountants, and perhaps even some
politicians, as banks seem to do in Germany. Whomever they
might choose, their nominees could reasonably be expected to
respond primarily to the interests of investors, rather than to
the interests of managers, when interests diverge.
Would investor capitalism actually advance the interests of
savers, or merely subject savers to the depredations of another
cast of managers? If indeed it would be beneficial to savers,
would it be beneficial or detrimental to other constituents of en-
terprise? Is it feasible at all? These questions will be explored in
the pages that follow.
III. THE MOTIVATION OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
Whether institutional investors will exert their latent power to
enhance the profitability of enterprises will depend, in large
part, on the motivation of institutional managers. They are pre-
sumably no more and no less faithful than enterprise managers
to their fiduciary duties. Like enterprise managers, institutional
managers can be expected to maximize the financial returns of
their funds, so long as the effort to do so contributes to their
own rewards and job security. When their rewards are
threatened and, even more, when their job security is imperiled,
some of them are likely, like enterprise managers, to put their
personal rewards and job security ahead of the interests of their
constituents.
The important question is whether the self-interest of institu-
tional investors will counteract the deficiencies of managers or
72. C. VOGEL, supra note 66, at 120-31. There was no category that was likely to be
filled with the executives of other corporations, who predominate on American boards.
73. The frequency with which institutional investors' officers and directors serve on
the boards of portfolio companies in the United States was the subject of a report in 5
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d. Cong., 1st Sess. 2716-48 (1971) [hereinafter INST. INV. STUDY]. In
800 portfolio companies, there were 1125 instances of institutional directors and 92 in-
stances of institutional officers serving as directors of portfolio companies. In many of
these cases, the institutions were banks or insurance companies that were creditors as
well as shareholders of the portfolio companies.
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will reinforce them. If institutional managers collude with enter-
prise managers to maximize the rewards of both at the expense
of constituents, savers will be worse served by investor capital-
ism than by pure managerialism. If, on the other hand, the self-
interest of institutional managers is served by restraining the oc-
casional egoism of enterprise managers, investor capitalism may
enhance the profitability of enterprises for the benefit of savers
and other enterprise constituencies. The following pages offer
some reflections on the motives that are likely to animate the
players under a regime of investor capitalism. Understanding
these motives requires a preliminary glance at the identities and
roles of the principal players.
A. The Players in Investor Capitalism
Under managerialism, the principal players in the game of en-
terprise governance are the enterprise managers and the enter-
prise directors whom the managers have selected. The share-
holders are generally acquiescent. The managers report to the
directors on what they have done, are doing, or plan to do, and
ask the directors to approve. The directors ask a few questions,
make a few suggestions, and eventually approve or, if they disa-
74gree deeply, resign.
As institutional investors become more active, various addi-
tional players and their roles become significant. Several catego-
ries of players call for separate recognition.
1. Fund managers- Funds, like other business organiza-
tions, possess officers who bear primary authority and responsi-
bility for managing the assets of the fund. Specific provisions on
this point are found in the Employee Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act (ERISA), which requires, with limited exceptions, that
assets be entrusted to designated trustees.7 5 The Investment
Company Act imposes fiduciary duties on investment advisers.76
In other funds, authority and responsibility are generally borne
under general principles of corporation law by directors and of-
74. On the advisory role of directors, see M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY
(1971). On resignation as the "ultimate protest" of a director, see DIRECTORSHIP PRAC-
TICES, supra note 4, at 19-20. On the need for disclosure of resignations and reasons, see
Weiss & Schwartz, Using Disclosure to Activate the Board of Directors, in CORPORA-
TIONS AT THE CROSSROADS: GOVERNANCE AND REFORM 109, 166-174 (D. Demott ed. 1980).
For an instance of quiet resignation of outside directors, see Rowan & Moore, Behind the
Lines in the Bendix War, FORTUNE, Oct. 18, 1982, at 156, 163.
75. 29 U.S.C. § 1102 (1982).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1982).
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ficers, or under the general law of trusts by anyone to whom
powers of management have been delegated. These persons, who
do not enjoy any widely recognized generic name, are identified
in this Article as "fund managers."
Although the law assigns comprehensive power and responsi-
bility to fund managers, they do not in practice make most of
the funds' decisions independently. They are subject to influence
from fund sponsors and investor services, and they delegate
some of their functions to portfolio managers. Understanding
the dynamics of fund behavior calls for an examination of the
diverse roles and motivations of these various actors.77
2. Fund sponsors- The largest group of institutional inves-
tors, measured by value of shareholdings, consists of pension
funds. These funds are rarely, if ever, the creatures of their pres-
ent and prospective pensioners. They have been created and are
maintained in existence by private and public employers, gener-
ally characterized as their "sponsors," and their behavior varies
widely according to their sponsorship.
One important group of sponsors consists of business enter-
prises; corporations like General Motors and American Tele-
phone have their own pension funds. Funds of this type, com-
monly identified as "private pension funds," possessed in 1984
more than half of the equities attributed to all insurance, pen-
sion, and mutual funds.78 Contacts among them are facilitated
by the Association of Private Pension and Welfare Funds and,
among their sponsors, by the Financial Executives Institute.
Trustees of private pension funds usually owe their positions
directly or indirectly to officers of the sponsoring corporations
79
77. Vectors that affect the voting of fund shares are described in J. HEARD, CONFLICTS
OF INTEREST IN PENSION FUND VOTING (1987) (published by the Investor Responsibility
Research Center). The present author derived additional information from conversations
with Mr. Heard, Director of the Corporate Governance Service of the Investor Responsi-
bility Research Center, and Robert A. G. Monks, President of Institutional Shareholder
Services, Inc. An earlier exploration of voting of pension fund shares, directed chiefly to
social rather than financial issues, was contained in Pension Fund Investment Policies:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Citizens and Shareholders Rights and Remedies of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). See, e.g., id. at 164, 169
(prepared statement and testimony of Harrison V. Smith, Executive Vice President of
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co.); id. at 230 (prepared statement of John W. Heilshorn, Ex-
ecutive Vice President of Citibank); J. ALLEN, THE EXERCISE OF VOTING RIGHTS BY LARGE
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS: A SURVEY (1977) (Congressional Research Service report), re-
printed in id. at 309-46.
78. See FLow oF FUNDS, supra note 53, at 36. This document estimated total equities
owned by insurance and pension funds and by mutual funds in 1984 at $578 billion, of
which $294 billion were held by "private pension funds."
79. See Minow, One Man's Pension Trustee Is Another's CEO, Wall St. J., Apr. 23,
1987, at 32, col. 3.
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and are likely to vote shares in conformity with the views of the
financial officers of the sponsors.
A second group of pension fund sponsors is sponsored by
states and cities. Officers of the California, New Jersey, New
York City, and Wisconsin funds were prominent in the forma-
tion of the Council of Institutional Investors. These funds have
spoken out in opposition to antitakeover defenses and in protest
against General Motors' policies in paying bonuses to its execu-
tives and a large premium to Ross Perot."
A third group of sponsors consists of organizations like univer-
sities, churches, and foundations, which can be grouped under
the name of "public benefit corporations." Their funds are fre-
quently characterized as "the nonprofits," although the epithet
applies logically to the sponsors, rather than to the funds. The
most prominent fund of this type is the College Retirement Eq-
uities Fund (CREF), officers of which have been active in oppos-
ing poison-pill defenses. Organizations of this type have not yet
formed any association for concerted action.
Another immense category of funds comprises investment
companies, of which the most conspicuous are "mutual funds."
Many of these funds were originally sponsored by investment
bankers like Merrill Lynch or Morgan Stanley but are now re-
quired to be legally independent of these sponsors. However,
they often depend on their sponsors to steer customers in their
direction and therefore may remain somewhat responsive to the
officers of their original sponsors. Most mutual funds are mem-
bers of groups, such as the Fidelity group and the Vanguard
group, which share advisory services, and are likely to share
views that are common to the groups, rather than diverging ran-
domly. Most of these funds, or their managers, are members of
the Investment Company Institute, which gathers and publishes
data on investment company operations and presumably in-
forms federal agencies and legislators about group interests. The
Institute does not purport to advise or inform its members with
respect to their voting of portfolio shares.
3. Portfolio managers- Decisions to buy or sell securities
and to vote them one way or another are generally made not by
the nominal fund managers, but by individuals or firms who are
assigned responsibility for particular categories of securities, like
"domestic equities" or "bank stocks." These firms and individu-
als are commonly known as "portfolio managers." Some portfo-
80. Levin, GM Executives to Explain Perot Buyout to Institutional Investors and
Analysts, Wall St. J., Dec. 15, 1986, at 2, col. 3.
[VOL. 22:1
Beyond Managerialism
lio managers are direct employees of the fund, but others are
employees of separate investment advisors."1 Under this proce-
dure, portfolio managers are different people, with perspectives
that differ from those of the fund managers.
Portfolio managers are often in a precarious position because
the fund managers reserve the power to withdraw assets on
short notice and transfer their custody to other portfolio manag-
ers. 2 On one hand, portfolio managers run the risk of losing
their jobs because they are realizing lower rates of return than
other managers of similar portfolios. "Returns" include not only
dividends received and capital gains realized, but also paper
profits (or losses) on the market values of securities. In this situ-
ation, portfolio managers can seldom afford to wait for a long-
deferred price appreciation; if the price falls in the meantime,
the assets in their custody may be moved to another portfolio
manager.
On the other hand, portfolio managers may be pressured by
sponsors to oppose takeover bids, even though the bid would en-
hance returns if it succeeded.8 3 Witnesses at a Congressional
hearing on pension-fund management testified that portfolio
managers are sometimes coerced by their sponsors into voting
against the interests of investors. A portfolio manager may be
warned that if it votes against a takeover defense in Enterprise
A, it will lose the accounts of the pension funds of Enterprises B
and C.
8 4
4. Investor services- Various investor services have under-
taken to supply information to investors about how they may
vote to protect their interests.
The Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) was es-
tablished in 1972, in response to the flood of shareholder propos-
als involving racial discrimination, pollution, South African in-
81. Pension Funds, supra note 37, at 6 (statement of W. Gordon Binns, Jr.); id. at 58
(statement of Roger C. Bransford); id. at 77, 120 (statement and testimony of Tamar
Frankel); id. at 87 (statement of James E. Heard). For comment on the plusses and
minuses of outside portfolio managers, see Jansson, Second Thoughts About Outside
Managers, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, July 1987, at 137.
82. For an account of one year's shifts of portfolios among managers and a case study
of portfolio losses by one manager, see The 1987 Pension Olympics, INSTITUTIONAL IN-
VESTOR, Feb. 1987, at 89.
83. Parker, The Proxy Pressure's On, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, Sept. 21, 1987, at
3, col. 1. For an analysis of sponsors' motivations, see text of Part HID infra.
84. Pension Funds, supra note 37, at 125 (testimony of Tamar Frankel); id. at 88
(statement of James E. Heard); id. at 100 (statement of Robert A. G. Monks). W.
Gordon Binns, Jr., acknowledged that pressure was sometimes applied, but said it was
successfully resisted. Id. at 18-19.
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vestments, and other social issues.85 During the 1980s, the IRRC
devoted increasing attention to takeovers and takeover defenses,
publishing a number of statistical studies of the effects of take-
overs and analyzing the votes of institutional investors on take-
over defenses." James M. Heard, director of the Corporate Gov-
ernance Service of IRRC, became a prominent advocate in
Congressional hearings and elsewhere for investor activism. 7
Institutional Shareholders Services, Inc. (ISS) was founded in
the 1980s by Robert A. G. Monks, a former administrator of the
Office of Pension and Welfare Benefits, an agency of the Depart-
ment of Labor that monitors the activities of pension funds. It
promotes joint action by institutional investors in defense of
shareholder interests in shareholders' meetings and in proposals
made to Congress, to federal administrative agencies, and to
state legislatures.8
United Shareholders Association (USA) was formed in 1986
by Boone Pickens with the stated purpose to "restore manage-
ment accountability and increase corporate competitiveness." It
appears to direct its appeal primarily to individual sharehold-
ers.89 In mid-1987, the Association claimed about 12,000
members.90
B. The Wall Street Rule
According to a broad current of conventional wisdom, inves-
tors of all kinds are wise to forgo active participation in corpo-
rate governance, because they can protect their interests at less
expense by selling their shares in enterprises that are inef-
ficiently managed and switching their resources to better-man-
aged companies. This principle of investor behavior has been
85. H. TALNER, THE ORIGINS OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 44-46 (1983). This title was
published by IRRC.
86. See, e.g., J. HEARD & H. SHERMAN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE PROXY VOTING
SYSTEM (1987); S. MARCIL & P. O'HARA, VOTING BY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON CORPO-
RATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN THE 1987 PROXY SEASON (1987). Both of these titles were
published by IRRC.
87. See Pension Funds, supra note 37, at 87-89.
88. For more specific examples of ISS activities, see the ISS Newsletter (a monthly
publication issued by Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., 3050 K. St., N.W., Suite
300, Washington D.C. 20007).
89. See announcements and news releases distributed periodically in 1987 to mem-
bers and prospective members from the Association's office, 1667 K St., N.W., Suite 770,
Washington D.C. 20006.
90. Letter from H.T. Bogardus of the United Shareholders Association to the author
(Aug. 11, 1987) (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.).
[VOL. 22:1
Beyond Managerialism
called the "Wall Street rule.""' Its validity is said to be corrobo-
rated by the infrequency of investor opposition to management
proposals and the even greater infrequency of investor nomina-
tions of directorial candidates to oppose the managers'
nominations.
Although the Wall Street rule fits a typical individual inves-
tor, there are reasons to doubt that it fits a typical institutional
investor in the 1980s. Selling out is a good alternative only for
the holder of a small block of shares who gets the news before it
is public or before others have time to act on it. The holding of a
large fund or a large family of funds may be too large to liqui-
date without pushing down the price.92 When the bad news is a
crown jewel lockup, it may come too late for any investor to sell
before the price drops.'3
Moreover, the costs that any one institution would incur in
organizing joint action with other institutions are much less than
the magnitude of the losses imposed upon funds, or of the gains
denied them, by managers' antitakeover tactics. The size of in-
stitutions' holdings enables them to assemble an impressive
block of votes by canvassing a few hundred alert and sophisti-
cated institutional holders, rather than thousands of passive in-
dividuals.94 In a sample of 42 publicly held companies that were
more than 50 percent owned by institutional investors, none had
more than 900 institutional shareholders, and half of them had
less than 200."
The recent emergence of activism on the part of pension funds
indicates that the Wall Street Rule is no longer a pervasive prin-
91. CORPORATE AccouNrrABErrY, supra note 34, at 392.
92. CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 34, at 394-95; E.V. Regan, Pension
Funds: New Power, New Responsibility, Wall St. J., Nov. 2, 1987, at 28, col. 3; see also
comments of Daniel J. Baum and responses of Fred E. Brown in Mutual Funds as Inves-
tors of Large Pools of Money, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 669, 673-78 (1967).
93. Although a number of studies have been made of the effects of defensive mea-
sures on security prices, they have not distinguished different kinds of defenses and have
reached conflicting results. See, e.g., J. POUND THE IMPACT OF ANTITAKEOVER CHARTER
AMENDMENTS ON CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (1985) (publication of the Investor
Responsibility Research Center).
94. Richard Schlefer, Investment Officer of College Retirement Equities Fund
(CREF), offered the following cost-benefit analysis in an interview with the author on
October 19, 1987. About one fourth of CREF's equity holdings of $30 billion, or $7.5
billion, are vulnerable to takeover bids. Surveys have shown that poison pills reduce the
market values of shares by an average of one percent, which would amount to $75 million
in CREF's holdings. CREF's anti-poison pill campaign in 1987 involved total costs in
time and communications of less than $10,000-about one tenth of one percent of
CREF's stake in the outcome of the campaign.
95. For the characteristics of this sample, see MOODY'S, supra note 54.
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ciple of conduct among institutional investors." As institutional
holdings grow, the rule will become less and less tenable as a
canon of investment behavior.
C. The "Collective Good" Dilemma
The structure of institutional investment presents a peculiar
obstacle to the participation of institutional managers in corpo-
rate governance. Although the community of funds might in-
crease total returns by causing enterprise managers to accept
tender offers rather than repel them by nonproductive expendi-
tures, the effort required would cost time and money to the
portfolio managers that would undertake it, while the benefits
would be shared by all the other portfolios that hold shares in
the same enterprise. The other managers would take a "free
ride" on the efforts of the activists. Since the activists' funds
would gain no more than the passive ones, but would incur ex-
penses that the passive funds would escape, the activist manag-
ers would be likely to record lower returns than the passive ones.
The costs of activism may include not only the time of em-
ployees that is diverted from trading to rallying votes, but also a
loss of access to opinions of enterprise managers who would be
antagonized by the fund's activism, so that the fund would be
disadvantaged in its trading. Although these costs may be inca-
pable of separate measurement, they may diminish the activists'
rate of return enough to divert business from activist funds to
passive ones.
For these reasons, the effective supervision of enterprise man-
agers presents a classic example of a "collective" or "common"
good, like clean air and safe streets, which benefits the whole
population, including those who make no contribution to their
costs.9 7 If the good is attained, it confers aggregate benefits on
96. CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 34, at 397.
97. M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS 14 (1971) defines a common, collective, or public good as any good such that, if
any member of a group consumes it, it cannot feasibly be withheld from other members
of the group. The concept is best known in its applications to goods that are usually
provided by governments, like police protection and paved streets. In this sense, it has
been applied to mandatory financial disclosure by issuers of securities. See Coffee, Mar-
ket Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REv.
717, 723-37 (1984); Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of
Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 680-85 (1984). But it applies equally to better wages and
working conditions, which may be sought by private collective action of employees, or to
higher prices for products, which may be sought by private collective action of industrial
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the entire group that exceed the aggregate costs of obtaining
them. But the benefit that will be received by an activist mem-
ber is usually less than the costs incurred by that member in
obtaining the benefits.
This deterrent to active supervision is particularly acute for
portfolio managers, because fund managers may shift portfolios
from one portfolio manager to another on the basis of minute
differences in rates of return. The portfolio manager has little to
gain from enhancements of enterprise returns that are shared by
all its competitors, but has something to lose by spending money
on supervision and by antagonizing the managers of portfolio
enterprises.
Under these circumstances, one cannot be surprised to find
that institutional investors generally neglect their chances to en-
hance their returns by supervising enterprise managers. What is
surprising is that some institutions have become active in oppos-
ing managerial tactics. In 1986 and 1987, very large funds with
highly diversified portfolios made the effort to organize share-
holder voting on questions like poison pills." In the spring of
1987, shareholder proposals were made in more than 60 compa-
nies by large institutional shareholders, including the Public
Employees and Teachers Funds of California, the Wisconsin In-
vestment Board, and the College Retirement Equities Fund.9
Various explanations for these funds' activism may be sug-
gested. In the first place, managers of these funds may reasona-
bly expect their constituencies of governmental employees and
teachers to applaud their efforts to restrain managerial self-serv-
ing, without questioning the possible costs.100 Besides, their
holdings may be large enough so that a very minor enhancement
of their rate of return offsets the costs of activism.'' Finally, the
managers of these broadly based pension funds are much less
cartels, or to richer returns for corporation shareholders, which may be sought by super-
vision of management. See M. OLSON, supra, at 6-7.
98. Rosenberg, The Revolt of the Institutional Investors, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR,
May 1987, at 131.
99. ISS ISSUE ALERT, May 1987, at 1, col. 1.
100. This hypothesis seems contrary to the analysis of M. OLSON, supra note 97, who
assumes that group members will be moved only by economic calculations, which they
will make with mathematical rationality. I assume, on the contrary, that individual sav-
ers will sometimes pursue ideological objectives like disinvestment in South Africa with-
out regard to costs, and that even when they pursue purely economic objectives, like the
acceptance of tender offers, they tend to overlook the transaction costs of attaining
them.
101. For the possibility of voluntary collective action led by group members who have
a disproportionately large interest in the outcome, see M. OLSON, supra note 97, at 141-
48.
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vulnerable than portfolio managers to the danger of losing ac-
counts if their rates of return are a shade under those of compet-
itors; the teachers and civil servants whom they serve usually
have no opportunity to switch their savings from the pension
fund designated by their employer to an independent fund that
is recording higher returns.
The important question ahead is whether other
funds-particularly private pension funds-will support the ac-
tivism of the large public funds. The private funds would incur
no measurable monetary expense by voting for propositions ini-
tiated by the public funds. Informed observers have expressed
privately the belief that many portfolio managers are inclined to
vote against target defenses, and do so unless constrained by
fund sponsors.0 2 The effective supervision of managers seems
therefore to depend on whether private pension fund managers
will pursue the common interests of their constituents or re-
spond instead to the promanager biases of fund sponsors.
D. The Influence of Fund Sponsors
Managers of sponsoring corporations may use their influence
over fund officers and trustees to induce them to vote their
shares in favor of managers of portfolio companies without re-
gard to the maximization of returns on the funds. Some enter-
prise attorneys and officers have openly urged company execu-
tives to join forces in supporting defenses against contested
takeover bids."' Frankel, Heard, and Monks testified in the
Pension Funds hearings that portfolio managers are sometimes
threatened with losing accounts unless they support the manage-
ment of a takeover target.10 The testimony did not reveal how
frequently this phenomenon occurs, nor how widespread are the
conditions that facilitate it. At least one takeover defense advo-
cate circulated widely an appeal to fund sponsors to direct their
fund managers to support takeover defenses.' 05
102. Conversation with James M. Heard of the Investor Responsibility Research
Center (May 20, 1987); conversation with Robert A. G. Monks of Institutional Share-
holder Services (May 21, 1987).
103. J. HEARD & H. SHERMAN, supra note 86, at 50-53, 97-100; The Battle for Corpo-
rate Control, Bus. WEEK, May 18, 1987, at 102, 106; Corporate Managements Fight
Back, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, May 1987, at 139.
104. Supra note 81; see also Cohen, Gambling with the Future, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12,
1986, at A25, col. 1.




A survey conducted by the Employee Beneficial Research In-
stitute reported that 65 percent of "pension fund investment
managers" had been pressed to vote in favor of management on
takeover questions."' 6
E. The Power of Portfolio Enterprise Managers
When institutional investors attempt to exercise their statu-
tory powers as shareholders over portfolio enterprises, enterprise
managers have several ways of fighting back. 10 7 Managers often
have various captive blocks of shares that will vote for manage-
ment against any combination of outsiders. The most frequent
are the company pension plan and the company Employee Stock
Ownership Plan (ESOP). Enterprise managers, exercising the
powers of the enterprise as sponsor, can usually direct the votes
cast by the trustees of these plans.10 8 Their votes seldom amount
to a majority but may supply a critical addition to other blocks.
Enterprise managers also have a subtle means of exerting in-
fluence over portfolio managers and fund managers who have no
organizational links with the enterprise. They can pick and
choose the analysts whom they invite to their seminars, and with
whom they have business lunches. At these trysts, they are likely
to impart something less than material inside information, but
something more than their published releases. They can leak de-
Recently the chairmen of GTE and Rockwell wrote to the chairmen of other
companies asking support in the form of instructions to pension fund managers
to vote in favor of charter amendments designed to protect against abusive take-
over tactics. . . . I believe that it is time that all companies make their views
known to their pension fund managers, banks, insurance companies and other
institutions. If the corporate community makes its views known in a strong and
decisive manner, support for corporate raiders and abusive takeover tactics will
be reduced dramatically and legislation to abolish abusive takeover tactics would
be a reality.
Copies also were circulated to a large number of academic commentators on takeover
law.
106. Parker, supra note 83. In this report, the term "pension fund investment man-
agers" seems to have been used to designated the players charactrized in this article as
"portfolio managers." The same source reported that only 25% of "corporate pension
executives" reported feeling pressure from sponsors.
107. J. HEARD & H. SHERMAN, supra note 86, at 50-53, 97-100; The Battle for Corpo-
rate Control, supra note 103; Corporate Managements Fight Back, supra note 103.
108. For illustrations of the use of pension funds and ESOPs to support management
in takeover battles, see Norlin v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984); Buck-
horn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,371 (S.D.
Ohio, Feb. 11, 1987); see also Robertshaw, Bill Boosts ESOP Role, PENSIONS & INVEST-
MENT AGE, Oct. 19, 1987, at 1, col. 2; Kotlowitz & Bean, Spate of Corporate Buy-Outs by
ESOP's Raises Questions of Benefits to Workers, Wall St. J., Sept. 30, 1987, at 16, col. 2.
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tails about sales and expenses, and their own guesses about the
effects of pending economic and political developments. They
can deliberately exclude from these meetings analysts who have
voted shares in ways that they regard as hostile.10 9
The analysts who are most vulnerable to this kind of pressure
are the portfolio managers whose investment returns are regu-
larly compared with the returns of competitors; they cannot af-
ford to miss a market movement that is known to their
competitors.
Even public pension fund managers may be vulnerable to
pressure or blandishment by officers of portfolio companies. Af-
ter the Wisconsin Investment Board filed a shareholder proposal
for referenda on a transaction like the buy-back of Perot's
shares, GM officers visited the Wisconsin governor and Invest-
ment Board, and the proposal was withdrawn.110
F. The Fiduciary Duty of Fund Managers
Fund and portfolio managers are, of course, under extensive
fiduciary duties. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act
is particularly explicit about fiduciary duties, providing a general
definition of the duty (the prudent man standard of care) and a
litany of prohibited transactions."" The Investment Company
Act (ICA) does not define or enumerate fiduciary duties, but it
imposes explicit liability for breaches of fiduciary duty." 2 Even
without these statutory pronouncements, investment managers
are bound by general fiduciary duties under the law of trusts."1
The voting of shares, however, is not mentioned by either
ERISA or the ICA among the acts to which the fiduciary duty
applies, and the law of trusts has very little to say about it. 1 4
109. For discussion of the practice of disclosing to invited analysts material that is
not given to the press, see Guyon, Company Meetings with Analysts Raise Questions
About Disclosure, Wall St. J., Dec. 17, 1986, at 25, col. 4. This article does not report
discrimination among analysts, but the possibility is inherent in the practice of admit-
ting by invitation.
110. Burr, Investors Ease Stance Against GM, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, Feb. 9,
1987, at 2, col. 2; Some GM Investors Are Wimps, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, Feb. 23,
1987, at 10, col. 1; Conversation with Patricia Lipton, Executive Assistant to Wisconsin
Investment Board (May 27, 1987).
111. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1982).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-36 (1982).
113. See H. BINES, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 1 1.01 (1978); 2 T. FRAN-
KEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS 371-75 (1978).
114. H. BINES, supra note 113, 1.03, at 1-39, raises the question of fiduciary duty in
voting but offers no answer. The duty is not mentioned by T. FRANKEL, supra note 113,
[VOL. 22:1
Beyond Managerialism
But there is no reason to doubt that voting is covered. With re-
spect to ERISA, Labor Department officials have affirmed the
duty of fiduciaries to vote shares in the interests of fund benefi-
ciaries, 115 but there is no report of any administrative or judicial
sanction against fiduciaries for voting errors.
When portfolio managers vote shares against the interests of
their beneficiaries in order to please their sponsors or the man-
agers of their portfolio enterprises, they are obviously violating
their fiduciary duties.1 6 But their liability for breach of trust is
unlikely to deter them when the pressure is on. Fund benefi-
ciaries would have very little chance to detect the breach, and
even less chance of proving any damage.1 17 Even if a judge found
that defeating a particular tender offer deprived a fund of a
measurable profit, the judge might be persuaded that siding
with the target's managers conferred net benefits on the fund.
The fund managers might persuade the judge that if they had
taken an antimanagement stand, the fund sponsor would have
exercised legal options to curtail contributions to the fund or to
withdraw excess reserves from it. Alternatively, they might con-
vince the judge that they had to maintain a promanagement
stance in order to receive favored access to the perspectives of
the managers on enterprise prospects. Judges who have absolved
target company managers of liability for rejecting handsome
takeover bids 18 would probably be equally sympathetic to fund
managers who have sided with the target company managers.
Even if a court found a violation of duty, the amount of harm
suffered would be too uncertain to form a basis of liability. One
decision has imposed liability on a trustee for benefits conferred
on an affiliate by the trustee's trading, even without harm to
nor by B. LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE PRUDENT MAN RULE
(1986).
115. PWBA Prohibits Proxy Voting by Trustees or Named Fiduciaries Where In-
vestment Manager Has Such Authority, 6 Pens. Plan Guide (CCH) V 23,747W (Feb. 23,
1988) (Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Labor, to Helmuth
Fandl, Chairman of Retirement Board of Avon Products, Inc.); see also J. HEARD & H.
SHERMAN, supra note 86, at 32 (statement of Robert A. G. Monks, Administrator of Of-
fice of Pension and Welfare Benefits of U.S. Department of Labor); The Battle for Cor-
porate Control, supra note 103 at 106-07 (statement of David M. Walker, Deputy Assis-
tant Secretary for Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs).
116. See comments of Frankel, Heard, and Monks, supra note 84.
117. Pension Funds, supra note 37, at 125-26 (testimony of Tamar Frankel). Frankel
suggested that criminal penalties should be added to the civil liabilities of ERISA.
118. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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beneficiaries.' 19 But it is hard to imagine proof of any measura-
ble benefits received in compensation for casting one of several
hundred votes at a shareholders' meeting.
G. Summary on Motivation
The available evidence indicates that institutional investors
who are relatively independent of pressures from enterprise
managers are prepared to exercise their voting power to enhance
investors' returns. They are not deterred by the prospect that
enhanced returns will be shared, like other collective goods, by
most of their competitors.
When institutions support defensive tactics of enterprise man-
agers, or refrain from opposing them, they are probably respond-
ing to pressure, or the fear of pressure, from fund sponsors or
from the managers of portfolio enterprises, or to a fear of vari-
ous juridical risks that attend investor activism. The next sec-
tion of this paper explores some of the juridical risks.
IV. LEGAL OBSTACLES TO INVESTOR ACTIVISM
When institutions surmount the motivational conflicts of ac-
tivism, they confront a remarkable dearth of legislative support
for investor participation in governance, and a surprising series
of perils implicit in federal securities laws. The Commission and
the federal courts, in zealous efforts to catch malefactors, have
constructed doctrines that threaten investors with formidable li-
abilities and burdens if they exercise their statutory rights in
corporate governance. The net effect of securities laws and regu-
lations is not to support shareholders' rights, but to fortify the
entrenchment of management.
A. The Legislative Silence
Although judges sometimes refer to the "will of Congress" to
insure the rule of shareholders in corporate affairs, 1 0 and the
119. Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113 (7th Cir. 1984).
120. See, e.g., Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225, 232 (9th Cir. 1975) ("In enact-
ing section 14(a) [of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934], Congress intended to guaran-
tee the integrity of the processes of corporate democracy.").
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SEC has promulgated a few symbols of "shareholder democ-
racy," the securities laws and regulations are critically deficient
in support of shareholders' power in corporate governance. They
remain silent on the most important instruments of shareholder
suffrage.
Aside from a few bills that never emerged from committee,121
members of Congress have shown little interest in the rights of
shareholders to participate in corporate governance. The hun-
dreds of pages of hearings and debates on the Securities Act of
1933 are devoted, like the Act itself, wholly to securities sales.122
Although the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contained a sec-
tion on proxies, the hearings and debates that preceded it were
focused on market abuses, with only rare and casual references
to the roles of shareholders and directors in corporate govern-
ance. 2 ' No mention of problems of governance appeared in ei-
ther President Roosevelt's letter to the Senate supporting the
bill, 2 4 or in the bill's statement of purpose.
125
B. The Vulnerability of Voting Rights
A single section in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,128 and
none in the Securities Act of 1933,127 deals with security-holders'
voting. Unlike most other substantive provisions of the Ex-
change Act, which contain specific Congressional commands,
this one contains only a grant of power to the SEC to make rules
"in the public interest or for the protection of investors" that
121. The most significant were S. 2567, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), entitled "Protec-
tion of Shareholders' Rights Act of 1980," which was introduced by Senator Howard
Metzenbaum, and was the subject of committee hearings, and H.R. 7010, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1980), which was entitled "Corporate Democracy Act of 1980," and was introduced
by Congressman Rosenthal.
122. See 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AcT oF 1933 AND SECURITIES Ex-
CHANGE AcT OF 1934 (J. Ellenberger & E. Mahar eds. 1973) (hearings reprinted) [herein-
after LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra (debates reprinted).
123. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY. supra note 122 (vols. 4-9). Brief references to the sep-
aration of ownership from control and to the abuses of control by executives awarding
themselves excessive compensation appear in 78 CONG. REc. 7861-62, 7922-23, 7926
(1934), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 122.
124. 78 CONG. REc. 2264, reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 122; 78
CONG. REc. 8048 (1934), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 122 (remarks by
Senator Thomas upon submission of an amendment).
125. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1982) [hereinafter Ex-
change Act].
126. Exchange Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1982).
127. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982).
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relate to the solicitation of proxies.12 It says nothing about rules
on the rights of a security-holder to cast votes, or the subjects on
which their votes may be cast. By the time Congress enacted the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 and the Investment
Company Act of 1940, it had become cognizant of the problem,
and required equal voting rights for common shareholders in
both of these acts. 129 But Congress remained mute with regard
to voting rights in corporations of other types.
The historic silence of Congress on shareholders' voting rights
need'not be read as a signal of indifference toward them. Before
the eruption of the antitakeover panic, most industrial corpora-
tions that were publicly traded showed no inclination to limit
voting rights. The largest ones were generally listed on the New
York Stock Exchange, which had required since 1926 that listed
common shares have equal voting rights.'30
Publicly owned corporations of that day which were not al-
ready listed on NYSE aspired to be so listed when their size and
investor interest would justify it, and tailored their charters to
be prepared for listing. The American Stock Exchange and the
Automated Quotation system of the National Association of Se-
curities Dealers (NASDAQ) never adopted a similar rule. By
1986, expansion of these markets had made a NYSE listing dis-
pensable. Companies listed on NYSE threatened to delist unless
NYSE would relax its rule, and NYSE petitioned the SEC for
permission to list nonvoting common stock.' 3 '
After long deliberations and consultations, 32 the SEC issued,
in July 1988, a rule that purports to freeze voting rights, but
128. Exchange Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982).
129. Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 § 7(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 79g(c)(1)
(1982); Investment Company Act of 1940, § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(i) (1982). On voting
rights under the Investment Company Act, see also 3 T. FRANKEL, supra note 113, at
178-95.
130. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL I 313.00(A) [hereinafter
NYSE MANUAL].
131. NYSE's Proposed Rule Changes on Disparate Voting Rights, 18 SEc. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) 1389-92 (1986); Ingersoll, SEC Seeks Views on Possible Compromise on 1-
Share, 1-Vote Rule for Stock Markets, Wall St. J., Dec. 18, 1986, at 5, col. 1. For evalua-
tions of the proposed change, see Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of
Dual Class Common Stock, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 119 (1987) (favoring the proposal); Selig-
man, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One
Vote Controversy, 54 Gao. WASH. L. REV. 687 (1986) (opposing the proposal); Dent, Dual
Class Capitalization: A Reply to Professor Seligman, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 725 (1986)
(favoring the proposal).
132. See Voting Rights Listing Standards-Disenfranchisement Rule, Exchange Act
Release No. 25,891, 25,891A [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec L. Rep. (CCH) 1
84,247 (July 7 and 13, 1988); Voting Rights Listing Standards-Proposed Disen-
franchisement Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 24,623 [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
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leaves untouched the unequal voting rights that had already
arisen, 8 s and permits the emasculation of existing voting rights
by the issuance of new nonvoting or limited-voting shares.
1 34
C. The Emptiness of Shareholder Proposal Rights
In a genteel gesture of sympathy with advocates of share-
holder democracy, the SEC has given shareholders low-cost ac-
cess to the suffrage of their colleagues through the shareholder
proposal rule. 36 The rule permits a shareholder to circulate a
proposition to the entire body of voting shareholders at the com-
pany's expense, through the company's own proxy statement.
But the Commission has framed the rule so narrowly that it
provides no means of challenging the essential quality and poli-
cies of management. A shareholder's proposal cannot nominate
directors, nor even express opposition to the management's
nominations.' Even a proposed bylaw on the qualifications of
directors was held to be outside the scope of the proposal rule.
13 7
Likewise, the proposal right is made unavailable to oppose
anything that the management submits to a shareholder vote.'3 8
This means that shareholders cannot use the company proxy
statement to oppose the shark-repellent amendments that pose
the greatest threat to their interests. Shareholder proposals have
generally been limited to procedural subjects, like cumulative
L. Rep. (CCH) 84,143 (June 22, 1987). In addition to the obvious arguments about the
sufficiency of the market as a protector of investor interests, there was debate about the
extent of the power of the SEC to regulate voting rights. See Coffee, Regulating the
Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Cor-
porate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1266-69 (1984); Seligman, supra note 131, at
714-19.
133. Exchange Act Rule 19c-4(a) & (b), 53 Fed. Reg. 26,394 (1988) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4(a) & (b)).
134. Exchange Act Rule 19c-4(d), 53 Fed. Reg. 26,394 (1988) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. § 240.19c-4(d)). Firms can issue new non-voting or limited-voting shares and use
the proceeds to buy back voting shares on the open market. See Hart, SEC May Kill
Shareholders with Kindness, Wall St. J., July 14, 1988, at 26, col. 3.
135. Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(1988). For a historical review of the rule, see
H. BOOTH, THE SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL RULE; SEC INTERPRETATIONS AND LAWSUITS
(1987); CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 34, at 133-226.
136. Rule 14a-8(c)(8), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(8) (1988).
137. Rauchman v. Mobil Corp., 739 F.2d 205 (6th Cir. 1984). The proposal would
have excluded citizens of OPEC member countries from directorships. Since an OPEC
citizen was a candidate for election at the next shareholders' meeting, the court ruled
that the proposal was related to an election and therefore inadmissible.
138. Rule 14a-8(c)(9), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(9) (1988), allows the company to omit
a proposal if it "is counter to a proposal to be submitted by the registrant at the same
meeting."
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voting and classified boards, and to "public interest" concerns
like environmental protection and withdrawal from South Af-
rica, which have little to do with the productivity of the enter-
prise and seldom interest more than 5 percent of the
shareholders." 9
Support for shareholder proposals attained new highs in 1987,
when a proposal to require shareholder referenda on poison pills
won average support of over 29 percent, and in one company
passed 45 percent. Proposals to withdraw from South Africa ob-
tained average support surpassing 12 percent. 40 But if managers
seize the initiative, and solicit shareholder approval of a poison
pill, the rule will bar shareholders from using the company's
proxy statement to oppose it.
When the shadow of institutional activism loomed on the ho-
rizon in the early 1980s, the Commission further narrowed the
shareholder proposal right in a way that crippled its use in the
cases where it was most likely to be effective. The Commission
ruled that a shareholder could not put a proposal in the com-
pany's proxy statement if the shareholder had sent proxy mater-
ials at its own expense to holders of more than 25 percent of the
shares."" Under this rule, a fund that had taken the precaution
of canvassing the views of other funds before filing a proposal
forfeited its right to use the company proxy statement to reach
the tens of thousands of individual shareholders. This bizarre
restriction was dropped in 1987 after a number of bills in sup-
port of shareholders' rights had surfaced in Congress. "2
139. Leavell, Corporate Social-Reform, The Business Judgment Rule and Other
Considerations, 20 GA. L. REv. 565 (1986); Liebeler, A Proposal to Rescind the Share-
holder Proposal Rule, 18 GA. L. REv. 425 (1984); Comment, SEC Rule 14a-8: New Re-
strictions on Corporate Democracy?, 33 BUFFALO L. REV. 225 (1984); Comment, The 1983
Amendments to Shareholder Proposal Rule 14a-8: A Retreat from Corporate Democ-
racy?, 59 TUL. L. REv. 161 (1984); CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILTY, supra note 34, at 156-64.
A major development in the rule, as analyzed by H. BOOTH, supra note 135, at 28-31, was
an increase from three percent to five percent in the vote required to justify a resubmis-
sion of a defeated proposal.
140. IRRC NEws RELEASE, June 23, 1987, at 3, 6. Further details on poison pill pro-
posals and a tabulation of votes on these proposals in 30-odd companies may be found in
Franklin, supra note 58.
141. Rule 14a-8(a)(1)(ii), added by Exchange Act Release No. 20,091, Amendments to
Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security
Holders, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,417, at 86,202 (Au-
gust 16, 1983). The explanation offered was that a shareholder who could reach holders
of 25% without the company's aid could reach the rest in the same way.
142. See Proxy Rules-Amendments to Eliminate Filing Requirements for Certain
Preliminary Proxy Material; Amendments with Regard to Rule 14a-8, Shareholder Pro-
posals, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,211 at 88,949 (Dec. 21,
1987) (Exchange Act Release No. 25,217). For the Congressional bills, see supra note 30.
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In 1980, an SEC staff group considered the possibility of al-
lowing shareholders to nominate directors in the company's
proxy statement 143 but announced no conclusion. Aside from the
obvious impracticability of presenting the nominations of every
shareholder, the staff were apparently impressed with testimony
that most shareholders would have no idea about the most suita-
ble candidates. They seem to have ignored the possibility that
institutional investors would be competent to make informed
nominations, and to surmount a threshold (like five or ten per-
cent of outstanding shares) that would restrict nominations to a
workable number.
Shareholders' rights to nominate directors on the company's
proxy statement were also contained in the proposed Protection
of Shareholders Rights Act of 1980 and Corporate Democracy
Act of 1980,4 neither of which emerged from committee
hearings.
D. The Liability of Controlling Persons
If a coalition of investors should succeed in selecting a board
of directors of its choice, notwithstanding the unhelpfulness of
the proxy rules, it would face formidable risks of civil and crimi-
nal liability. These would result from a broad definition of "con-
trol" that the Commission has promulgated and persuaded a
federal court to accept.
Under the securities laws of 1933 and 1934, anyone who "con-
trols" an enterprise is liable prima facie for every violation of
federal securities laws committed by that enterprise.145. The
controlling person can escape this prima facie liability only by
proving that it "had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to
believe" the facts involved (if the liability is under the Securities
Act), or that it "did not directly or indirectly induce" the acts
involved (if the liability is under the Exchange Act).""
143. CORPORATE AcCOUNTABILITY, supra note 34, at 35-37, 50-54, 65-68.
144. Supra note 34.
145. Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1982); Exchange Act § 20, 15
U.S.C. § 78t (1982).
146. More specifically, Securities Act § 15 excuses a controlling person who "had no
knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of
which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist." 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1982).
Exchange Act § 20(a) excuses a controlling person who "acted in good faith and did not
directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action."
15 U.S.C. § 78 (a) (1982).
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The legislators who enacted this provision presumably con-
templated the kind of control exercised by railroad and public
utility holding companies and by investment bankers like J. P.
Morgan & Co., who caused controlled companies to issue masses
of unsound securities in the 1920s.147 A few senators and con-
gressmen may have contemplated other kinds of control, such as
"management control" and "control through a voting trust,"
that were described by Berle and Means in The Modern Corpo-
ration and Private Property, published the year before the Ex-
change Act was adopted. 148 In any case, they were visualizing the
domination of company policies by persons other than the
elected directors, as contemplated by the corporation laws.14
The securities acts did not define "control," nor specify the
means of proving it. In a zealous effort to facilitate proof, the
SEC defined "control" to consist not only of the dictation of pol-
icies, but of the mere "power to direct or cause the direction of
147. See Federal Securities Act: Hearings on H.R. 4314 Before the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 228-48 (1933) (testimony of Rob-
ert E. Healy, General Counsel of the Federal Trade Commission), reprinted in 2 LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 122 [hereinafter House Hearings '33]; Securities Act: Hear-
ings on S. 875 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.
211-26 (1933) (testimony of Robert E. Healy, General Counsel of the Federal Trade
Commission), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 122 [hereinafter Senate
Hearings '33]; Stock Exchange Practices, S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 333-391
(1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 122; F. PECORA, WALL STREET
UNDER OATH 1-19, 113-30 (1939); J. SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 22-
23, 36-37 (1982).
148. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 3, at 69-118.
149. The original bills that evolved into the Securities Act of 1933 did not contain
any control provisions. House Hearings '33, supra note 147, at 1-9; Senate Hearings '33,
supra note 147, at 1-9. The ancestors of the control provision emerged in a revision of S.
875 that was reported to the Senate on May 8, 1933. 77 CONG. REC. 2979-82 (1933), re-
printed in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 122. They consisted of a definition of
"dummy" (§ 2(k)), id. at 2979, and the insertion of "dummy" along with "device,
scheme or artifice" among the things whose use to defraud was forbidden (§ 13), id. at
2982. "Dummy" was defined as:
a person who holds legal or nominal title to any property but is under moral or
legal obligation to recognize another as the owner thereof; or a person who has
nominal power or authority to act in any capacity but is under moral or legal
obligation to act therein in accordance with the direction of another.
Id. at 2979. The Conference Committee eliminated the dummy clauses and introduced
the provision that became § 15, with this explanation:
The Senate amendment contained provisions referred to as "dummy provi-
sions" which were calculated to place liability upon a person who acted through
another, irrespective of whether a direct agency relationship existed but depen-
dent upon the actual control exercised by the one party over the other. The
House bill did not contain these provisions. The various provisions of the Senate
amendment on this subject have been welded into one and incorporated as a
new section in the substitute.
Id. at 3902.
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the management and policies of a person, whether through the
ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise." 150
Under a literal interpretation of this definition, any organized
majority of shareholders is prima facie liable for securities law
violations committed by the issuer of their shares.161
If a shareholding institution should combine with others to
elect a majority of directors, it might subject itself to prima facie
liability for any slips that a portfolio company might make in
conforming to the hundreds of rules issued by the Commission.
By combining to elect directors of their choice, institutions
would arguably demonstrate their "power . . . to cause the di-
rection" of the enterprise. One need not wonder why institutions
have neglected to join forces to exercise their voting rights.
If the SEC ever decides to give substance to the voting power
of investors, it can take a giant stride in that direction by modi-
fying its definition of "control" to signify actual direction of pol-
icies, rather than mere "power to cause the direction." For good
measure, it could expressly exempt investors that are unaffili-
ated with each other, and that combine only to elect directors,
without constricting the autonomy of the directors that they
elect. The liability that Congress wanted to impose upon "con-
trolling persons" would still apply to holding companies, trust
companies, and financiers that dictate the decisions of their
portfolio enterprises." 2
E. Freezing Stockholdings
Beside incurring liability for securities violations of portfolio
companies, members of a coalition that elected (or had power to
elect) a majority of the directors of a portfolio company might
find themselves frozen in their holdings. This consequence could
follow from another of the SEC's expansive applications of its
concept of "control."
150. Rule 405 under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1988) (emphasis
added).
151. This definition differs significantly from the one employed in section 2(a) (9) of
the Investment Company Act of 1940, which states: "'Control' means the power to exer-
cise a controlling influence over the management or policies of a company, unless such
power is solely the result of an official position with such company." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
2(a)(9)(1982) (emphasis supplied).
152. Cf. Hass, Insights into Lender Liability: An Argument for Treating Controlling
Creditors as Controlling Shareholders, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1321 (1987).
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When shares are sold by a "controlling person," the broker
who executes the sale is deemed to be an "underwriter."' 53 Sales
by underwriters have to be registered unless they qualify for an
exemption.15' Since registration takes time, a shareholder who
has to register before selling is likely to lose the critical moment
for selling.
This inconvenience does not normally trouble an institutional
investor, since its holdings in any one enterprise are usually
small enough to fall within the "leakage" exemption of Rule
144.165 However, the sales of persons who "act in concert for the
purpose of selling" are "aggregated" in determining the limits of
the exemption. 56 If several members of a large family of funds,
like the Fidelity or Vanguard groups," 7 were to sell at about the
same time, they could be accused of selling in concert.
This trap, like that of liability for securities acts violations,
could be eliminated by relaxing the Commission's definition of
"control."
F. The Forfeiture of Short-Term Gains
If an institution's sales are not frozen by the control principle,
they may be penalized by the deputization principle. When a
shareholder secures the election of a director in a company, and
the person elected has authority over investments in the share-
holder's portfolio, the shareholder has been held to become a di-
rector by deputy.6 8 As a director, the investor is obliged to sur-
render the excess of any sale price over the price of any purchase
made within six months before or after the sale.6 9
On this principle, an institution that participates in electing
one of its own analysts to a directorship is likely to forfeit its
ability to realize a gain or escape a loss by a quick turnaround,
153. United States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779, 782 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
946 (1969); Securities Act of 1933 § 2(11), 15 U.6.C. § 77b(11) (1982).
154. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1982).
155. Rule 144 under the Securities Act of 1933, codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (e)
(1988), contains a variety of alternative limits on transaction size, of which the most
important are one percent of the outstanding shares of the class, or, if greater, an aver-
age week's trading.
156. Rule 144(e)(3)(vi), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e)(3)(vi) (1988).
157. In mid-1986, 35 Fidelity group stock funds held aggregate assets of about $10
billion, while 20 Vanguard stock funds held assets of about eight billion dollars. 1986
Fund Ratings, FORBES, Sept. 8, 1986, at 112, 118-19, 144.
158. Feder v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 263-64 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. de-
nied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970).
159. Id. at 266-67 (applying Exchange Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982)).
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and thereby to sacrifice the interests of its clients, and lose in
the competition among institutions for the best rates of return.
Under these circumstances, no prudent investment manager will
nominate a member of its own staff for a directorship in a port-
folio enterprise.
One sensible solution of this problem would be to repudiate
the deputization principle, which deters not only institutional
investors, but also most other investors, from exercising influ-
ence on corporate management. But a less radical change would
help. At the least, unaffiliated institutions that combine to
choose directors could be exempted from the deputization prin-
ciple. A director can conceivably help a single sponsor with in-
side information but can hardly give an advantage to a whole
group without destroying the advantage.
G. The Group Filing Requirements
Under an SEC rule, persons who "agree to act together for the
purpose of . . . voting . . . equity securities" form a group'
that is obliged to file the same package of information that is
required of a purchaser of shares that increases its holdings be-
yond the five-percent level. 161 The rule is an extravagant exten-
sion of the statute, which requires filing by persons who "act as
a. . . group for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing
of securities.' 1 62 It is supported by a second circuit dictum that
the mere agreement to vote together constitutes an "acquisition"
for purposes of the filing requirement.'
The Seventh Circuit took a narrower view of the statute, and
ruled that a mere agreement to solicit votes did not trigger the
reporting requirement,'6 but the broader interpretation remains
in force in the Second Circuit, where the most cases are likely to
be adjudicated. 6 5
160. Rule 13d-5(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5(b)(1) (1988).
161. Rule 13d-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (1988).
162. Exchange Act § 13(d)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (1982) (emphasis added).
163. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 715-716 (2d Cir. 1971). The facts of the
case showed purchases concurrent with the agreement, but the court did not rely on the
purchases for its application of § 13(d).
164. Bath Industries, Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 109 (7th Cir. 1970); Calumet Indus-
tries, Inc. v. MacClure, 464 F. Supp. 19, 29-31 (N.D. 11. 1978).
165. Moreover, one of the bills introduced in Congress in early 1987 proposed to
amend Exchange Act § 13(d)(5) to make a combination for voting an express trigger of
the filing requirement. S. 227, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1987) (introduced by Senator
D'Amato).
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The information that must be filed by virtue of this interpre-
tation and rule comprises not only the identification of holders
and their holdings, but also their sources of finance and future
plans for acquisitions and control. 6 ' Additional reports must be
filed promptly after any change amounting to one percent in the
holdings of the group, 67 which would require every member of
the group to know the acquisitions and dispositions of other
group members. Any institution that files under this would ex-
pose itself to the blizzard of litigation over the adequacy of dis-
closure that has followed similar filings in tender-offer cases,
even where courts eventually determined that the disclosure was
adequate."'
Institutional investors and groups of institutional investors are
mercifully remitted to a lighter regime, which requires filings
only once a year and omits the requirement of information on
finance and on plans for control. " But the exemption applies
only if the members of the group have no purpose "of changing
or influencing control of the issuer," and only if every member of
the group is an institutional investor or other exempt person. 7
The practical effect is to deter prudent investors from nominat-
ing and electing directors and to frustrate the legislative design
of shareholder power over management.
If the Commission were inclined to foster the power of share-
holders, it could readily advance this objective by eliminating
"voting" from the group purposes that require filing under sec-
tion 13(d). The detailed disclosures and periodic amendments
required by that subsection may be appropriate for takeover
bidders, but they are grossly excessive for voting coalitions.
The only appropriate authority for regulating voting coalitions
is the proxy rules, which contain provisions designed for election
contests.' These rules require a full disclosure of the identity of
participants, of any unusual financial arrangements under which
shares are held, and of any understanding about future transac-
tions. 7 But they are significantly free of the requirement for
166. Schedule 13D, Items 3-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101, Items 3-4 (1988).
167. Rule 13d-2(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2(a) (1988).
168. For examples of litigation over adequacy of disclosures under Rule 13d, see
Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873;
Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada
Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1973). For comment on the economic effects of
litigation of this kind, see Rosenzweig, Target Litigation, 85 MIH. L. REV. 110 (1986).
169. Rule 13d-l(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(b)(1) (1988).
170. Rule 13d-5(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5(b)(2) (1988).
171. Rule 14a-11, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11 (1988).
172. Schedule 14B, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-102 (1988).
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amending the statement whenever the holdings of the entire
group vary by one percent, 7 ' which would require a group of
investors to report to each other on every purchase or sale. They
are also free of the requirement for a detailed disclosure of plans
to change the policies of a company, 74 which is inapposite to a
plan to elect directors who will reach their own conclusions
about the policies of the subject enterprise.
It may be that the rule on proxy contest disclosures will need
to be amplified when institutional investors make active use of
them. But the disclosures that will be appropriate for voting
contests will be quite different from those that fit takeover bids.
V. THE PROSPECTIVE CONSEQUENCES OF INVESTOR ACTIVISM
As policymakers face the growing potential of institutional ac-
tivism, they must address the question of whether this phenom-
enon is likely to enhance or to impair the benefits that enter-
prises bring to savers, employees, consumers, and communities.
On the positive side, institutional activism might enhance the
profitability of enterprises, reduce the wastes of takeover wars,
rationalize management compensation, and preempt shareholder
suits. On the negative side, it might sacrifice long-term gains to
short term profits, entrench inefficient managers in their jobs,
give institutions preferred access to inside information, and di-
minish the responsivity of enterprises to social demands. These
possibilities are the subject of discussion in the following pages.
A. Enhancing Profitability
The most immediate benefit that investor capitalism might
bring is enhancement of the profitability of portfolio enterprises.
According to the prevailing current of supposition in the legal
and economic literature of takeovers, there is an enormous op-
portunity for such enhancement in enterprises. Increases in
profitability are believed to follow takeovers for various reasons,
which include synergies, financial gains (such as tax shields and
increased leverage), market power, and efficient management." 5
173. Cf. Rule 13d-2(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2(a) (1988).
174. Cf. Schedule 13D, Item 4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101, Item 4 (1988).
175. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Re-
sponding to a Tender Offer, supra note 20, at 1165-74; Jensen & Ruback, The Market
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This line of thinking assumes that outside observers of target
enterprises can perceive opportunities of increasing profitability
on a scale that justifies paying premiums that average 30 percent
over prior market prices of target shares.176 Since a large propor-
tion of enterprises have proved to be takeover targets, there
must also be a very large fraction of enterprises that are falling
far short of their profit potentials.
If takeover bidders can see opportunities to enhance profit-
ability through better management, directors of potential target
companies should be even better situated to perceive the oppor-
tunity and take advantage of it. Since the directors of most tar-
get enterprises have not done so, one must infer that these di-
rectors are poorly qualified, or (more likely) are unduly
protective of the incumbent managers.
On these suppositions, institutional investors should be able
to choose directors who would perceive opportunities to enhance
profitability and would move to exploit them more promptly and
less expensively than through takeover battles.
B. Cooling the Takeover Wars
Investor activism offers intriguing possibilities of reducing the
waste of resources on takeover campaigns and takeover defenses.
First, let us consider those target enterprises that inspire take-
overs because they present an opportunity to enhance profitabil-
ity by a change of management. If directors were oriented to-
ward the interests of investors, rather than the interests of
managers, they should be just as able as outsiders to see the op-
portunity and change management without the stress and strain
of a takeover. If they failed to act before a takeover bid materi-
alized, they would not fight the bid, but offer just enough resis-
tance to bargain for better terms. Since a consensual takeover is
vastly less expensive to the bidder than a contested one, target
directors should be able to negotiate favorable terms quite
readily.
Second, let us consider those takeover bids that are not in-
spired by target companies' potential for increased profitabil-
for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 23-27 (1983);
Sprinkel, supra note 17.
176. See Jensen & Ruback, supra note 175, at 7.
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ity,177 but by illusions of managerial superiority on the part of
the managers of bidding companies or by these managers' ambi-
tions to enhance their own prestige and rewards by presiding
over more gigantic enterprises. Investor-oriented directors in the
bidding companies would restrain their managers from ventures
that merely expand gross sales or assets without enhancing earn-
ings.17 8 By this means, they would not only save money for ac-
quisitive enterprises, but would also spare target enterprises
from the costs of fighting meretricious takeover attacks.
C. Rationalizing Managerial Compensation
For more than half a century, observers of the corporate scene
have denounced excessive compensation of executives. 1 9 A re-
cent example of a proposal of excessive compensation, blocked
only by the protests of institutional investors and Ross Perot,
was General Motors' proposal to pay executive cash bonuses
early in 1987, when the company was making massive layoffs of
middle managers and operatives.'8 " One can hardly believe that
executives in this bumbling enterprise were being eagerly se-
duced by offers from competitors.
Overcompensation in this sense is easily dismissed on the
ground that its direct effect on profitability is usually rather in-
significant. In multimillion dollar enterprises, the overcompensa-
tion of executives-however it is measured-makes a barely de-
tectable effect on the funds available for reinvestment or
distribution. Its principal vice is its destructive effect on mo-
rale. 81 From the perspective of lower level employees, unearned
bonuses of executives set the example for kickbacks to purchas-
ing agents and supervisors and for wage demands unrelated to
productivity.
Overcompensation is peculiarly immune to correction by ex-
isting mechanisms of corporate governance. The "independent
177. See J. POUND, ARE TAKEOVER TARGETS UNDERVALUED? AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINA-
TION OF THE FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TARGET COMPANIES (1986); E. HERMAN, supra
note 3, at 100-01.
178. See Kilman, supra note 61.
179. See Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591-92 (1933); P. DRUCKER, THE NEW SOCIETY
92-5, 251-52 (1950); Geneen, Why Directors Can't Protect the Shareholders, FORTUNE,
Sept. 17, 1984, at 28; Loomis, The Madness of Executive Compensation, FORTUNE, July
12, 1982, at 42; Vagts, Challenges to Executive Compensation: For the Markets or the
Courts?, 8 J. CoaP. L. 231, 252-57 (1981).
180. See GM Boots Perot, supra note 21.
181. See P. DRUCKER, supra note 179, at 92-5, 251-52.
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directors" who predominate on corporate boards are doubly bi-
ased; most of them owe their jobs to the executives whose com-
pensation they must determine and are themselves executives of
other corporations,' where they hope for reciprocal favor. 83
Management consultants, who prepare compensation plans, are
selected by directors who often share a common interest in rais-
ing the general level of executive compensation. When levels of
compensation are reviewed in derivative suits, judges can only
compare compensation in the case before them with compensa-
tion in other enterprises that are subject to the same biases.
Directors chosen by fund managers would be uniquely quali-
fied to determine objectively how much compensation is optimal
because they would be free of personal ties to the executives in-
volved. Their access to the accounts of other companies would
provide them with observations on the consequences of awarding
higher and lower levels of compensation. They could conduct ex-
periments with lower compensation that would never be sug-
gested by managerially appointed directors and could experi-
ment with higher compensation without being suspected of
boardroom bias. The arrangements that they would approve
would be more likely to be perceived as fair by lower level em-
ployees, and by judges when the arrangements are challenged in
derivative suits. The predominance of institutional nominees on
boards would eliminate much of the suspicion and resentment
that is currently associated with the compensation of executives.
D. Preempting Shareholder Suits
Investor capitalism might reduce, in two ways, the waste and
annoyance of shareholders' suits-both direct and derivative.
First, the presence of directors who are responsive to investors
might restrain managers from many of the actions that provide
grounds for shareholders' suits. Second, the existence of a board
that is demonstrably responsive to investors' interests, rather
182. See Useem, Shared Directorships among Large Corporations and the Forma-
tion of a Nationwide Business Leadership, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTION-
ALIZING ETHICS 31 (W. Hoffman, J. Moore & D. Fedo eds. 1983) [hereinafter ETHICS];
Corporate Governance: A Look at the Future, in INVESTOR REsPONsIBILITY RESEARCH
CENTER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ISSUES FOR THE 1980s, at 84, 88-89 (1983) (remarks by
Roger F. Murray) [hereinafter ISSUES].
183. This inference is contrary to the view of Vagts, supra note 179, at 275-76, who
argued that executive compensation could be controlled by staffing compensation com-
mittees with outside directors, providing shareholders with better data on prevailing
standards of compensation, and more rigorous scrutiny by judges in derivative suits.
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than to the interests of managers, would reinforce the disposi-
tion of judges to rely on the judgment of directors.
E. The Quick Buck Bias
The most widely advanced apprehension of detrimental conse-
quences flowing from institutional investors' influence is the fear
that institutional investors will sacrifice long-term objectives by
grasping immediate gains.
The most prominent of the ideas involved in this accusation is
the belief that institutional investors grasp tender offers at
prices above the pre-tender market price without regard to the
probability of realizing more by waiting for the target enterprise
to reap the benefits of the farsighted policies of managers. Har-
old Williams, former chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, observed that, "[W]e've heard a lot today ...
about the short-term outlook of the institutional investors, and,
indeed, their outlook is very short-term. '" 184 A CEO of a major
corporation was heard to ask, in the course of a tirade against
"raiders," "Can you apply the word 'owner' to a 26-year-old pen-
sion-fund trader sitting at his CRT screen and trying to out-
perform the woman down the hall?" In a like vein, a representa-
tive of the Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans
remarked in colloquy that "the investment manager seems to
live or die on the relatively short-term merits of his or her own
performance." ' The charge has evidently been heard by fund
managers, several of whom took pains in a House pension fund
hearing to deny that they act on a short-range horizon.186 One
corporate executive has proposed that the tax-exempt status of
pension funds be eliminated in order to reduce the funds' short-
term pressure on capital markets.
187
184. Williams, Luncheon Speech, in IssuEs, supra note 182, at 111, 115 (1983); see
also The Corporate Board: Institution at the Crossroads, in ISSUES, supra note 182, at 9,
42, 40, 107 (remarks of A.A. Sommer, Jr. and Ira M. Millstein); Corporate Governance: A
Look at the Future, in IssuEs, supra note 182, at 84, 107 (remarks of Roger F. Murray).
185. Pension Funds, supra note 37, at 133 (testimony of Roger C. Bransford).
186. Pension Funds, supra note 37, at 7, 32, 59 (testimony of W. Gordon Binns, Rob-
ert J. Scott, and Roger C. Bransford). The force of Bransford's disclaimer was somewhat
muted by his observation, supra note 185, about what "the investment manager seems to
live or die on."
187. Idea Sounds Funds' Death Knell, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, Feb. 9, 1987, at
10, col. 1.; cf. Mayer, Tax-Free Funds' Unfair Advantage Damages Markets, Wall St. J.,
June 27, 1988, at 12, col. 3; Rohatyn, Institutional 'Investor' or 'Speculator?, Wall St. J.,
June 24, 1988, at 18, col. 3 (proposing a 50% tax on all trading gains under one year).
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The charge that fund managers systematically seize takeover
bids even when target managers foresee greater gains from hold-
ing on is plausible, even though no empirical proof of it has been
presented. If one fund realizes a takeover premium while a sec-
ond fund passes it up in reliance on long-term expectations of
target managers, the first fund will show a better return in the
next quarterly comparison, and the second firm may have no
chance to vindicate its faith in long-term expectations because it
may be squeezed out of the captured enterprise at a price re-
lated to the pre-tender market.
But this charge, even if true, does not show that fund manag-
ers are not acting in the best interest of savers. No one has pro-
duced any evidence that target enterprise investors have lost
money as a result of takeovers or of the partial liquidations that
sometimes follow them. The market's low evaluation of the tar-
get managers' expectations seems more likely to be based on an
objective valuation of available information than is the self-serv-
ing opinion of target managers. Even if fund managers accepted
the target managers' expectation of future profits for the enter-
prise, they could reasonably doubt that those profits would be
translated into gains for shareholders, rather than into perks
and job safety for the managers.
Even less does the charge imply that investor-oriented direc-
tors would favor short-term goals in enterprise management. An
SEC study indicated that institutions tend to favor enterprises
that have high rates of expenditure for research and
development.188
Proponents of the assertion that takeovers lead to the sacrifice
of long-term gains often adduce the charge that takeovers lead
to "bust-up mergers," in which components of an enterprise are
sold off to liquidate the costs of acquisition. 1 9 But components
are not sold unless someone is willing to buy them for more than
they contribute to the market value of the selling enterprise.
The laments about bust-up mergers have yet to be supported by
evidence that targets which defeat tender offers achieve market
values comparable to the tender offer.
Takeover critics also complain that enterprises become over-
indebted as a consequence of borrowings by takeover bidders to
finance acquisition or by borrowings by the targets to finance
188. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP, TENDER OF-
FERS AND LONG-TERM INVESTMENTS 12-18 (1985).
189. See Impact, supra note 25, at 13 (testimony of Martin Lipton).
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defenses, including leveraged buy-outs. 9 ' It is certainly true
that contested takeovers and takeover defenses have resulted in
a massive rise in the debt ratios of corporations. But this conse-
quence appears to flow not so much from the funds' receptivity
to takeover bids as from managers' resistance. If target manag-
ers would willingly accept takeovers, many of them would be ac-
complished by share-for-share exchanges, without any increase
in debt. The increase in debt is most often a feature of borrow-
ing to finance a cash tender offer to overcome a resistant target
management, or of the target managers' own leveraged buy-out.
The culprits in the mounting debt scandal seem to be chiefly
resistant target managers, plus a corporate income tax system
that allows deductions for interest on high risk bonds, but none
for dividends on equity shares.
Moreover, the fact that institutions are prone to accept take-
over bids does not prove that increased investor activism would
accelerate takeovers. Although portfolio managers can seldom
afford to pass up a premium tender offer, they may simultane-
ously support takeover defenses that enable target managers to
bargain with bidders for better terms or even defeat the take-
over. A great many institutional investors' shares have been
voted in favor of defenses.' 9 ' Critics of these votes reproach the
voters for neglecting their fiduciary duties or violating them in
response to pressure from clients. 92 But investors may favor de-
fensive tactics as a device for producing an auction for control of
the target; some contemporary authors contend that this is the
optimal course for directors to pursue in the interests of share-
holders.0 3 The chances that investors would support defensive
measures, either in reliance on the target's future prospects, or
in support of an auction market, would be enhanced if investors
190. See Impact, supra note 25, at 577 (testimony of Preston Martin, Vice Chairman
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
191. Pension Funds, supra note 37, at 87-88 (statement of James E. Heard); Heard,
Pension Funds and Contests for Corporate Control, CAL. MGMT. REV., Winter 1987, at
89, 92-95.
192. Pension Funds, supra note 37, at 87-88 (statement of James E. Heard); id. at
27-28 (statement of Roland M. Machold); Heard, supra note 191, at 92-95.
193. See Bebchuk, Comment: The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95
HARv. L. REV. 1028 (1982); Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981). This is a tacit
assumption in the flurry of debate on particular tactics, like target tender offers. See
Bradley & Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock Repurchases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1377 (1986);
Bradley & Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock Repurchases and the Appraisal Remedy, 96
YALE L.J. 322 (1986); Gordon & Kornhauser, Takeover Defense Tactics: A Comment on
Two Models, 96 YA L.J. 295, 296 (1986).
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had greater influence over target managers' use of their defen-
sive weapons.
F. Entrenchment of Management"
There is an opposite peril of institutional investor activism
that has been little noticed, although it may well be greater than
that of the quick buck bias. This is the danger that enterprise
managers will use their power over institutional investors to en-
trench themselves against any attack and to paralyze the efforts
of institutional investors to protect the interests of savers.
Enterprise managers have means of exerting pressure on insti-
tutions that they could not exert on individual shareholders. In
particular, enterprise executives can put pressure on the execu-
tives of private pension funds, whom they often have power to
appoint and reappoint.19" They can cultivate friendly relations
with portfolio managers by preferring them in invitations to
company seminars.195 They can intimidate public pension fund
officers by suggestions of opening or closing plants in the af-
fected states. 96 Managers of one company can use these powers
to support the managements of other companies, in an alliance
of reciprocity. The fiduciary duty of fund and portfolio manag-
ers is a weak shield against these influences.'97
For these reasons, the enhanced influence of institutional in-
vestors may menace the interests of the beneficial owners and
other constituents of enterprises unless the voting of shares held
by pension funds is insulated from the influence of corporate
pension fund sponsors. In funds governed by ERISA, voting in
the interest of beneficiaries might be promoted by listing votes
along with other acts that are prohibited when they involve a
conflict of interest.198 For other funds, the general law of trusts
needs to be made more articulate with regard to trustees' duty
to vote, as well as to buy and sell, in the exclusive interest of
beneficiaries.1 99 Insulation might be accomplished by amending
194. See Minow, supra note 79.
195. See supra text in Part IIIE.
196. See supra text in Part 11IF.
197. See Parker, supra note 83.
198. Section 406 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (1982), lists various transactions with
parties in interest that are prohibited. Under § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1982), fiduciaries
who violate the prohibitions of § 406 are not only liable for damages, but also subject to
other equitable or remedial relief, including removal.




ERISA to require that fund managers delegate voting authority
along with investment authority to independent financial insti-
tutions, unless the managers are themselves independent finan-
cial institutions.
G. Preferential Access to Inside Information
A spontaneous response of many lawyers to the prospect of
increasing institutional investor influence over portfolio enter-
prises is the apprehension that institutional portfolio managers
will exploit their power by obtaining inside information.
This would be a valid objection to a system in which one par-
ticular institution, such as the Morgan Guaranty bank, 00 would
exercise a dominant influence because of its role as a lender, a
trustee of funds, and the affiliate of an underwriter. But the ex-
ploitation of inside information by a consortium of institutions
that hold a large fraction of the company's outstanding shares
would be virtually impossible. If any considerable fraction of the
group tried to use the information, the market would respond to
negative any advantage. Exploitation by particular group mem-
bers would be unlikely because each member of the group would
be alert to prevent any other member from gaining an advan-
tage. Institutions would probably refrain from naming their own
staff members to boards of directors; they would name individ-
ual shareholders or officers of other companies. If they some-
times named their own employees, they would be extravagantly
careful to build walls between their delegates and their portfolio
managers, in order to fend off inside information penalties.
A more likely danger is that institutional influence would in-
tensify the already prevalent practice of executives conveying
their perspectives on enterprise prospects in "seminars" that are
attended chiefly by institutional analysts, and rarely by individ-
ual shareholders.2 0 1 As a consequence, institutions as a group
might increase their advantage over individual shareholders in
access to information. The SEC's institutional investor study of
1971 reported that "institutions or their managers, by reason of
their ability to influence the outcome of efforts to transfer cor-
200. The pervasive influence of The Morgan Guaranty Trust Company was decried in
1 STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC FIN. OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY,
90TH CONG., 2D SESS., COMMERCIAL BANKS AND THEIR TRUST ACTIVITIES: EMERGING INFLU-
ENCE ON THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 2, 4-5 (Subcomm. Print 1968).
201. See Guyon, supra note 109.
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porate control, appear in a number of cases to receive preferen-
tial treatment as compared with individual investors."2"2
The priority of institutions in access to insider perspectives on
company prospects would not necessarily be detrimental to less-
informed individual investors, and might even be helpful to
them. Trading by well-informed institutions, like trading by ex-
ecutives, tends to enhance the efficiency of markets by accelerat-
ing market response to changing conditions.20 3 The contribution
of insider trading to market efficiency is not only celebrated by
critics of laws against insider trading, but conceded by defenders
of these rules, who claim that the harm done outweighs the effi-
ciency benefits.20 4
Unlike trading by executives, trading by institutions would
not give executives an incentive to manipulate information, nor
divert capital gains from ordinary investors.20 5 The gains made
would be dispersed widely among the individual savers, the pen-
sioners, and the endowments whose funds the institutions man-
age, augmenting returns on their investments and enhancing the
inducement for them to direct their savings toward capital
markets.
The jump ahead of the market that institutions gain by supe-
rior perspectives on enterprise prospects is not usually obtained
at the expense of individual investors, who inevitably trail be-
hind the market, but at the expense of arbitrageurs. The gains
of institutions are more likely than are the gains of arbitrageurs
to increase the rewards of savers and thereby enhance the incen-
tive to invest.
H. Loss of Social Responsivity
A last ditch argument against institutional activism is that in-
stitutional influence diminishes the responsiveness of enterprise
managers to the interest of employees, consumers, and commu-
202. 1 INST. INV. STUDY, supra note 73, at xxix. The preferential treatment was re-
ported to be partly in "premium prices" and "guaranteed profits" and partly in "non-
public advance information concerning takeover efforts."
203. With respect to trading by executives, see H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE
STOCK MARKET 93-110 & passim (1966); Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of Insider
Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 866-72 (1983).
204. See Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the "Chicago
School," 1986 DUKE L.J. 628, 645-48; Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Informa-
tion on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom under
SEC Rule 10b-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217, 1225-48 (1981).
205. On these consequences of executive trading, see Cox, supra note 204, at 642-53.
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nities. Although managers insist that they have no duties to
these constituencies, they claim that they have discretion to
shape enterprise policies in ways that benefit these constituen-
cies without material adverse consequences for investors. 0 6
Critics of institutional power contend that institutional inves-
tors, unlike enterprise managers, are bound by their fiduciary
duties, and impelled by competition, to vote with unmixed devo-
tion to pecuniary profit. Institutions have no contacts with en-
terprise customers, employees, or communities that might in-
spire beneficence toward these constituents, and they win no
praise for the social responsivity of their portfolio enterprises.
To this argument against enhancing institutional investor in-
fluence there are answers for observers at two poles of opinion.
At one pole, observers will applaud institutional indifference or
hostility to nonprofit impulses. This is the probable response of
observers who share the faith expressed in Milton Friedman's
famous dictum, "The social responsibility of business is to in-
crease its profits.
20 7
At the other pole, observers who favor social responsivity
should notice the total lack of evidence that institutional inves-
tors are less responsive than enterprise managers to social con-
cerns. In the House Pension Fund Hearings, a labor union repre-
sentative urged that pension funds should be invested "in
companies that emphasize employment security, retraining, good
labor-management relations, and acceptance of unions." He
thought that investments "in antiunion companies with a fre-
quent record of plant closings, layoffs, and shifting work off-
shore" should be avoided even if they provided "hefty pensions"
to the pensioners of other companies.210 But neither this witness
nor any others reported the actual pursuit of prolabor policies in
existing funds.20 9 The SEC's Staff Report on Corporate Account-
ability in 1980 investigated impacts of institutional investors on
206. For statements of associations of corporate executives on social responsibilities
of corporations, see BusiNEss ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
(1981); cf. DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES, supra note 4, at 9-10 (1973). For a sociologist's ob-
servations on corporate social behavior, see Coleman, Responsibility in Corporate Ac-
tion: A Sociologists's View, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND DIRECTORS' LIABILITIES 69
(K. Hopt & G. Teubner eds. 1984).
207. This is the title of an article by Milton Friedman that appeared in the New
York Times Magazine, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 32.
208. Pension Funds, supra note 37, at 41-42 (statement of Ronnie J. Straw, director
of the Development and Research Department of the Communication Workers of
America).
209. The testimony of Roger C. Bransford on behalf of the Association of Private
Pension and Welfare Plans, with 475 members, made no mention of supporting the em-
ployees' interest in governance. Pension Funds, supra note 37, at 57-76.
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the conduct of portfolio companies but reported no impact on
portfolio companies' responses to social issues.210 In 1976, Peter
Drucker concluded that "pension fund socialism" had made no
significant change in the relationship of business -enterprises to
employees." The five-volume study of institutional investors
published by the SEC in 1971 gave no attention to effects, if
any, of institutional investors on the social responsivity of port-
folio enterprises.212
The sparse evidence that exists on institutional investors' so-
cial responsivity indicates that some of them are very much con-
cerned with it. Institutional investors are the principal support-
ers of the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC),
which analyzes corporate actions with regard to their social im-
plications and informs its subscribers about its findings.21 Ac-
cording to the SEC Staff Study, "[Floundations and educational
institutions are more likely to adopt guidelines which incorpo-
rate social as well as financial or investment considerations.
'214
These charitable investors are likely to be joined by pension
funds like the College Retirement Equities Fund to which insti-
tutions of this kind commit funds.215 On the whole, the influence
of institutional investors on the responses of enterprises to social
demands seems unlikely to change substantially the responses
currently made by autonomous managers. Different institutions
have such divergent priorities among their social concerns that
they will rarely form a solid phalanx for or against any one pol-
icy." Enterprise managers will probably continue to exercise
their personal conceptions of social responsibility with regard to
environmental pollution, labor relations, and routine contribu-
tions to charities.
210. CORPORATE ACcoUNrABILITY, supra note 34, at 383-89.
211. P. DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION: How PENSION FUND SOCIALISM CAME TO
AMERICA 109-39 (1976).
212. INST. INV. STUDY, supra note 73. "[Tlhe Study found relatively little evidence of
concerted action to influence corporate management except in its case studies on trans-
fers of control." 1 INST. INV. STUDY, supra note 73, at xxviii.
213. The subscribers of IRRC in 1986 included 31 large trust companies, 65 invest-
ment managers and advisers, 34 public pension funds, 14 foundations, 110 educational
institutions, and a number of insurance companies, church funds, and other entities.
IRRC 1986 ANNUAL REPORT (1987).
214. CORPORATE ACCOUNTAILm, supra note 34, at 403 (citing J. HEARD, PROXY VOT-
ING BY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS: SIX CASE STUDIES (1979)); see also Vogel, Shareholder
Activism Today: An Update and Review, in ETHICS, supra note 182, at 77 (1983).
215. See Lee, Wharton, Chief of $54 Billion Fund, Is Advocate of Social Responsi-
bility, Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1987, at 14, col. 1.
216. See Lee, It's All Relative: Mutual Funds Discover 'Socially Responsible' Is in
Eye of Beholder, Wall. St. J., May 20, 1987, at 37, col. 4.
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If institutional activism has any net effect on social respon-
siveness, it will probably be a restraining influence on unusually
large gifts to pet projects of chief executives, like Ford Motor
Company's investment in Detroit's Renaissance Center. 17
The bottom line may be that the growing influence of institu-
tional investors will bring about a modest diminution in the to-
tal contributions of business enterprises to public-interest
projects.
I. The Choice
In the remaining years of the twentieth century, public and
private policymakers will choose by action or inaction whether
to tolerate a regime of managerialism, unchecked by the inter-
ests of investors, or a regime in which the interests of savers are
effectively represented by institutional investors.
If business managers are allowed to defeat takeovers without
regard to investors' interests, they will hold their positions of
power regardless of their inefficiencies and will reward them-
selves without regard to their productivity. These indulgences
will eventually produce demands for increased government regu-
lation, and perhaps government operation of basic industries, as
in France and Great Britain.
If institutional investors are enabled to combine in defense of
the interests of savers, enterprises may be driven to maximize
their profitability with a substantial reduction in the takeover
wars, and in the occasions for government intervention.
Investor capitalism would not give unchecked power to fund
managers. Investors can act only through executives, who will
normally be strong individuals, able to affect enterprise behavior
by the ways in which they inform investors and by the degree to
which they expedite or retard the implementation of investors'
wishes. The actual conduct of business in enterprises that are
actively supervised by directors whom investors have chosen will
reflect a series of compromises between the views of investors
and those of executives. The activation of institutional investors
appears, at this juncture, to offer the best hope of restoring to
private enterprise the vigor that is inherent in the design of
capitalism.
217. According to Lee Iacocca, Henry Ford II caused Ford Motor Company to con-
tribute over $100 million to the Detroit Renaissance Center ("RenCen"). L. IACOCCA, AN
AUTOBIOGRAPHY 106-07 (1984).
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Even enterprise managers are likely to benefit from investor
capitalism, although it would in the first instance diminish their
freedom of action. They would find institutional investors more
sympathetic to their expectations of deferred gains, if the insti-
tutional managers had more confidence that the enterprise man-
agers would respond to investor interests. Investor capitalism
would also improve enterprise managers' chances of defeating
shareholders' suits because judges would have more reason to
trust the opinions of directors chosen by investors than those of
directors chosen by enterprise managers.
Managers of potential targets would benefit from the installa-
tion of investor capitalism in potential bidders. Takeover bids
that are inspired by imperial ambitions rather than by realistic
probabilities of increased profitability would be more often sup-
pressed at their inception by the investor-oriented directors of
potential bidders.
Although one cannot expect most enterprise managers to wel-
come a shift from the autonomy that they now enjoy to a need
for continuous interaction with shareholder representatives, a
thoughtful analysis should lead them to the conclusion that if
they are themselves competent and faithful to their trust, they
would benefit from the prevalence of investor capitalism.
VI. PROPOSALS
The emergence of institutional investors' dominance in share-
holding offers a new opportunity and a new need for institu-
tional investors to restrain the occasional aberrations of
managerialism. This objective can be achieved without increas-
ing governmental and judicial intervention if institutional inves-
tors are liberated from the hobbles that inhibit their exercise of
the rights that the corporation laws purport to give them. I
sketch here for the attention of enterprise managers, institu-
tional investors, the SEC, and Congress some measures that
seem likely to advance the interests of the beneficial owners of
private enterprise.
A. Activation of Institutional Investors
Institutional investors of all types should join in the move-
ment of public pension funds to participate actively in supervis-
ing the management of portfolio enterprises. When institutional
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investors held a small minority of shares, they could plausibly
hope that individual investors would exercise the powers en-
trusted by law to shareholders. That is no longer possible. Man-
agers of all types of funds-pension funds, ESOPs, mutual
funds, and foundations-can not discharge their fiduciary obli-
gations without mobilizing their statutory powers of corporate
governance.
B. Liberation From Sponsors
Pension funds, ESOPs, and foundations that have been spon-
sored by business enterprises need to be liberated from dictation
of their voting practices by their sponsors. The statutes that
govern these organizations should affirm the duty to vote, just as
emphatically as they affirm the duty to trade, in the sole interest
of beneficiaries. The tenure of fund managers and the choice of
their successors should be determined by fund beneficiaries or
other persons who are independent of the sponsor, except under
fixed benefit plans in which the sponsor bears the investment
risk. Sponsors that retain direct or indirect control over fund
managers should lose tax deductions for contributions to these
funds, and funds controlled by sponsors should lose tax
exemption.
C. Liberation From Control Liabilities
Shareholders, including institutional investors, should be
freed from the threat of liabilities of "controlling persons" or of
"directors-by-deputy" when they join forces to elect directors
who supervise the management of enterprises as provided by
corporation laws. The SEC could point the courts in this direc-
tion by amending its definition of control. But Congress should
eliminate all doubt by inserting in the Securities Act and Securi-
ties Exchange Act a restrictive definition of control somewhat
like the one in the Investment Company Act.
D. Access to Company Proxy Statement
Significant groups of shareholders should have the same ac-
cess as management to the company proxy statement. Congress
should authorize access to the company proxy statement for
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nominations and for opposition to management proposals by any
group representing five percent of the shares, with authority for
the SEC to raise or lower the fraction so as to avoid a confusing
multiplicity of proposals while admitting significant alternatives
to management proposals.
E. Declaration of Policy
The control of business enterprises by their shareholders, in-
cluding their institutional shareholders, should be declared as a
purpose of each of the laws that govern securities, employee
pension and benefit funds, mutual funds, foundations, and other
institutional investors that are the subjects of feddral legislation.
The purpose clauses of these laws should be expanded to articu-
late this objective.
F. Attitudes of Enterprise Managers
Executives of business organizations should take a more
favorable view of investor activism. In the short run, it threatens
their autonomy, which they enjoy as much as do other custodi-
ans of power. In a longer view, it opens the way for creating an
atmosphere of greater confidence between shareholders and en-
terprise managers, for reducing occasions for intervention by
courts and commissions, and for quieting the demand for prolif-
erating rules on takeovers and takeover defenses. The revival of
capitalism through the activism of institutional investors offers
long-term benefits for all of the constituents of private
enterprise.
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